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In the antebellum nineteenth century, courts often voided legislative acts for 
substantive unreasonableness or for exceeding the scope of legitimate police powers. 
Contrary to the assertions of a number of modern scholars, however, this tradition 
does not support the concept of economic substantive due process. Courts voided mu-
nicipal acts exceeding the scope of legitimate police powers on two grounds—the law 
of delegation and the law of municipal corporations—that did not apply to acts of 
state legislatures. The states themselves were limited to reasonable exercises of the 
police power only when their asserted authority came into potential collision with 
federal constitutional requirements, most prominently the Commerce and Contracts 
Clauses. 
It was only late in the century, after the adoption of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, that a police-power version of substantive due process emerged as a limitation 
on state legislatures as courts began conflating, under the guise of “due process of 
law,” earlier doctrines that had used a similar vocabulary but for distinct purposes. 
Police-power limitations on state legislatures regulating purely internal matters 
therefore probably cannot be justified by any antebellum legal conception of due pro-
cess of law. A police-power analysis might, however, play some role in a Privileges 
or Immunities Clause challenge by analogy to antebellum Commerce Clause and 
Contracts Clause jurisprudence. 
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There has been renewed interest in recent years in the origi-
nal understanding of “due process of law.” In a recent article, Pro-
fessors Nathan Chapman and Michael McConnell argue that his-
torically, due process meant only that an individual could not be 
deprived of life, liberty, or property without a general and pro-
spective standing law, the violation of which had been adjudi-
cated according to a certain minimum of common-law judicial pro-
cedures.1 The state and federal due process and law of the land 
clauses imposed no substantive limitations on Congress’s or a 
state’s ability to legislate, except that they could not abrogate this 
minimum of procedural protection. Professor Ryan Williams, on 
the other hand, has argued that although before 1789 there was 
no substantive component to due process, antebellum courts de-
veloped a body of substantive due process law prior to the adop-
tion of the Fourteenth Amendment by which courts would guar-
antee unenumerated rights deemed fundamental from 
 
 1 Nathan S. Chapman and Michael W. McConnell, Due Process as Separation of 
Powers, 121 Yale L J 1672, 1679 (2012). For an earlier textual analysis of the clause that 
arrives at similar conclusions, see John Harrison, Substantive Due Process and the Con-
stitutional Text, 83 Va L Rev 493, 504–34, 552–55 (1997).  
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infringement by the state or federal governments.2 Several schol-
ars have pointed to cases in which courts invalidated legislative 
acts in excess of the police powers to regulate health, safety, and 
morals.3 Last year, another scholar claimed that the framers of 
 
 2 Ryan C. Williams, The One and Only Substantive Due Process Clause, 120 Yale L 
J 408, 454–70 (2010). 
 3 Professor Howard Gillman argues in his book on the subject that a police-powers 
jurisprudence “had been elaborated, clarified, and transformed into a workable set of doc-
trines by state court judges in the second quarter of the nineteenth century.” Howard  
Gillman, The Constitution Besieged: The Rise and Demise of Lochner Era Police Powers 
Jurisprudence 20 (Duke 1993). See also id at 10 (claiming that nineteenth-century judges 
would “uphold legislation that (from their perspective) advanced the well-being of the com-
munity as a whole or promoted a true ‘public purpose,’” while they would “strike down 
legislation that (from their perspective) was designed to advance the special or partial 
interests of particular groups or classes”). Professor David Mayer argues that “[i]n pro-
tecting liberty of contract,” the Supreme Court was recognizing “the validity of the police 
power in its traditional scope, as a protection of public health, safety, and morals,” and 
basing its jurisprudence “on well-established principles of American constitutional law: 
the use of the due process clauses, substantively, to protect property and liberty in all its 
dimensions, by enforcing certain recognized limits on the states’ police power, limits that 
had become federalized with the addition of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitu-
tion.” David N. Mayer, The Myth of “Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism”: Liberty of Contract 
During the Lochner Era, 36 Hastings Const L Q 217, 284 (2009). See also David N. Mayer, 
Substantive Due Process Rediscovered: The Rise and Fall of Liberty of Contract, 60 Mercer 
L Rev 563, 571 (2009) (claiming there was a “long history of substantive due process pro-
tections for liberty and property rights—a body of law concerning constitutional limits on 
government police powers that was well-established by the late nineteenth century,” and 
that the Lochner-era Court “was merely enforcing these traditional constitutional limits on 
the scope of the police power”); id at 585 (“American courts began applying the doctrine of 
substantive due process much earlier, not long after adoption of the Constitution itself.”). 
 Professor David Bernstein argues that “the idea that the guarantee of ‘due process of 
law’ regulates the substance of legislation . . . arose from the long-standing Anglo- 
American principle that the government has inherently limited powers,” and from “long-
standing American intellectual traditions that held that the government had no authority 
to enforce arbitrary ‘class legislation’ or to violate the fundamental natural rights of the 
American people.” David E. Bernstein, Rehabilitating Lochner: Defending Individual 
Rights Against Progressive Reform 9 (Chicago 2011). A few decades earlier, Professor  
Bernard Siegan wrote that “[t]he evidence is very persuasive that Lochner was a legiti-
mate interpretation of original meaning,” and that “[s]ubstantive due process was a very 
viable concept among Justices of the US Supreme Court at the time the fourteenth amend-
ment was framed and ratified,” pointing to a federal circuit court case in 1865 in which 
the court “held that a Pennsylvania statute repealing a railroad corporation charter vio-
lated the due course of law provision of the state constitution.” Bernard H. Siegan, Reha-
bilitating Lochner, 22 San Diego L Rev 453, 454, 488 (1985), citing Baltimore v Pittsburgh 
& Connellsville Railroad Co, 2 F Cases 570 (CC WD Pa 1865). Other scholars have found 
the seeds of the police-power limitations on state governments in Justice Thomas Cooley’s 
1868 treatise, contemporaneous with the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, which 
summarized antebellum state-court cases. See generally Thomas M. Cooley, A Treatise on 
the Constitutional Limitations Which Rest upon the Legislative Power of the States of the 
American Union (Little, Brown 1868). See, for example, James W. Ely Jr, The Oxymoron 
Reconsidered: Myth and Reality in the Origins of Substantive Due Process, 16 Const Com-
men 315, 342–44 (1999); Timothy Sandefur, Privileges, Immunities, and Substantive Due 
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the Fourteenth Amendment understood due process to protect 
unwritten fundamental rights, including the right to contract and 
acquire and possess property.4 
Most recently, Professors Randy Barnett and Evan Bernick 
have claimed that under an originalist interpretation of the fed-
eral Due Process Clauses, taking into account both their letter 
and “spirit,” due process of law requires courts to examine state 
legislative acts to determine whether they were enacted in a good-
faith pursuit of the legitimate ends of free government.5 This is so 
because the purpose of due process was “barring ‘arbitrary’ 
power,”6 where “arbitrary” is defined “with reference to the ends 
for which legitimate governments are established among men”as 
well as “the means which the Constitution authorizes to effectuate 
those ends.”7 Thus, courts must develop some kind of police- 
powers doctrine that takes into account the legitimate ends of 
government and ensures that legislatures only enact laws in pur-
suit of those legitimate powers. They claim that “antebellum 
courts repeatedly affirmed that legislative power was inherently 
limited by the ends for which legitimate governments are  
established.”8 
 
Process, 5 NYU J L & Liberty 115, 154 (2010) (claiming that Cooley’s “famous treatise” 
concluded that “the Due Process Clause protected substantive rights against unprincipled 
or arbitrary legislation”); Williams, 120 Yale L J at 493–94 (cited in note 2). See also 
note 35. 
 4 Kurt T. Lash, Enforcing the Rights of Due Process: The Original Relationship Be-
tween the Fourteenth Amendment and the 1866 Civil Rights Act, 106 Georgetown L J 1389, 
1459–60, 1466–67 (2018). 
 5 Randy E. Barnett and Evan D. Bernick, No Arbitrary Power: An Originalist Theory 
of the Due Process of Law, 60 Wm & Mary L Rev 1599, 1638 (2019) (“[I]mplementing the 
Fourteenth Amendment does require a conception of the legitimate ends of government 
that is consistent with the original function—the spirit—of the Due Process of Law Clause 
in the Fourteenth Amendment; and it requires a doctrinal approach to give the text legal 
effect today.”) See also id at 1661 (“In the case of states,” the “particular substantive limi-
tations” are “to be found both in the texts of state constitutions and in the inherent limits 
on all legislative power, whether or not such limits are expressly acknowledged in a state 
constitution.”); id at 1662 (“[T]he substantive protection from arbitrary power provided by 
the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process of Law Clause would be empty without an im-
plementing construction of the appropriate ends of state power, against which an act of 
the legislature can be evaluated.”) (citation omitted). 
 6 Id at 1643. 
 7 Id at 1644–45. 
 8 Id at 1636. In this regard, they follow in the footsteps of those who have argued 
that the Founders expected unwritten fundamental principles to be sources of constitu-
tional authority in addition to the Constitution’s written text. See generally, for example, 
Suzanna Sherry, The Founders’ Unwritten Constitution, 54 U Chi L Rev 1127 (1987). The 
difference is that Barnett and Bernick seek to root those fundamental principles in the 
written text itself. 
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In the nineteenth century, courts often invalidated legislative 
acts in excess of what became known as the police powers. But 
none of the cases regularly cited by scholars supports the substan-
tive due process thesis. Instead, closer examination of the cases 
reveals that antebellum courts applied a series of sometimes over-
lapping but distinct doctrines involving the police powers of leg-
islative bodies. These were principally three in number. 
First, state courts routinely invalidated municipal bylaws for 
being “unreasonable” or in excess of the police powers to regulate 
for the health, safety, and morals of the local citizenry.9 They did 
so because municipalities exercised only those police powers ex-
pressly delegated by the state, and their powers were thus strictly 
construed and impliedly limited to those that genuinely advanced 
the health, safety, and morals of the local population. Addition-
ally, these towns and cities were municipal corporations, and the 
courts subjected them to the common law of corporations. Accord-
ing to this common law, courts could void corporate acts if they 
were unreasonable, contrary to the general good of the corpora-
tion, or in restraint of trade. Neither rationale applied, nor did 
courts apply them, to acts of the state legislatures themselves, at 
least not in any of the cases that have been generally cited. 
Second, federal courts sometimes invalidated state legisla-
tive acts affecting interstate or foreign commerce if they were not 
genuinely for a police-power purpose and thereby impermissibly 
interfered with such commerce.10 Such legislative acts not genu-
inely for police-power purposes were deemed to contravene the 
federal commerce power, not any substantive rights guaranteed 
by the Due Process Clause, which of course did not apply to the 
states. This rationale for limiting the exercise of state power 
therefore did not apply to acts of state legislatures regulating 
solely internal commerce or local matters. 
Third, courts invalidated both state and municipal acts that 
impaired the obligations of contract. States and localities could, 
however, reasonably regulate existing contractual obligations if 
genuinely for police-power purposes.11 As with the negative Com-
merce Clause doctrine, this contracts doctrine was a court-created 
accommodation between the imperatives of the federal Constitu-
tion, which prohibited states from impairing contractual obliga-
tions, and the need for the states to be able to regulate their 
 
 9 See Part I.A. 
 10 See Part I.B. 
 11 See Part I.C. 
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internal police, which by necessity reached both property and con-
tract rights. 
If no impairment of existing contractual obligations was at 
issue and no regulation of interstate commerce was attempted, 
there appears to have been no doctrine known to the law by which 
courts could prevent a state legislature from enacting legislation 
contrary to natural principles of justice or to fundamental rights 
but that violated no state constitutional provision. At most, “sub-
stantive due process” in the sense of limiting the reach of state 
power even over purely internal matters appears to have been de-
ployed by some courts as a rule of statutory construction, by 
which they would presume the legislature intended to depart 
from fundamental maxims of free government as little as possi-
ble.12 It was not until after the adoption of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment that courts in the 1870s began inferring and imposing sub-
stantive due process limitations upon the state legislatures.13 
There are many reasons why the courts may have begun to 
do so in this era. The courts may have become familiar with judi-
cial enforceability of the public use requirement in the takings 
context,14 and they may have believed that the Privileges or Im-
munities Clause would itself have imposed such limits had it not 
been written out of the Constitution by the Slaughter-House 
Cases.15 (Indeed, as I suggest in Part IV, some such limits may be 
justified by that clause.16) The intellectual environment of the 
1870s through the first decade of the 1900s, marked by classical 
liberalism and “laissez faire capitalism,” also surely contributed.17 
 
 12 See Part II.C. 
 13 See Part III. 
 14 Professor Harry Scheiber claimed that the “confluence of [the] legal concepts” of 
“vested rights, eminent domain and police powers of the state . . . would occur repeatedly 
in nineteenth-century cases.” Harry N. Scheiber, The Road to Munn: Eminent Domain and 
the Concept of Public Purpose in the State Courts, in Donald Fleming and Bernard Bailyn, 
eds, 5 Perspectives in American History 329, 339 (Warren Center 1971); id at 374–76, 381–
82 (commenting on the overlap between eminent domain and police powers). 
 15 83 US (16 Wall) 36 (1872). See Stephen F. Williams, “Liberty” in the Due Process 
Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments: The Framers’ Intentions, 53 U Colo L 
Rev 117, 118–19 (1981). 
 16 See Part IV. 
 17 As Professor Clyde Jacobs observed: 
The development of the liberty of contract as a limitation upon the powers of 
both the state and the national governments was a judicial answer to the de-
mands of industrialists in the period of business expansion following the Civil 
War. It constituted judicial acceptance of the economic theory of laissez faire and 
of the philosophic ideal of individualism.  
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It is the contention here that at least one important cause of the 
emergence of a police-powers version of substantive due process 
in the 1870s was nothing other than a mistaken understanding of 
its historical antecedents—the conflation of a number of doctrines 
that all spoke in the vocabulary of the police powers, but which 
had distinct purposes. As recently as 2016, one substantive due 
process scholar observed that “no one has yet well explained how 
police powers, an un-enumerated powers doctrine, came to play 
such a large role in American constitutional jurisprudence.”18 The 
history traced here suggests one possible explanation. 
Some important clarifications are in order. Many proponents 
of substantive due process cite cases for a very narrow under-
standing that the clause prohibited legislatures from enacting in-
sufficiently general laws or from directly depriving someone of 
vested liberty or property rights.19 As Chapman and McConnell 
explain, these cases are consistent with the view that due process 
is fundamentally a separation of powers provision requiring a 
prospective and general law, the violation of which has been 
properly adjudicated, before an individual can be deprived of life, 
liberty, or property.20 Similarly, some scholars describe the Due 
Process Clause as “substantive” because it limits legislative 
power as well as judicial power—as it assuredly does by prohibit-
ing the legislature from reducing the procedural minimum.21 The 
dispute today is not over these concepts. Whether they are aptly 
described as “substantive” as opposed to “procedural” is of little 
 
Clyde E. Jacobs, Law Writers and the Courts: The Influence of Thomas M. Cooley,  
Christopher G. Tiedeman, and John F. Dillon upon American Constitutional Law 24 (Cal-
ifornia 1954). See also Michael Les Benedict, Laissez-Faire and Liberty: A Re-Evaluation 
of the Meaning and Origins of Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism, 3 L & Hist Rev 293, 293–
98 (1985) (describing the conventional wisdom about this period, although challenging it); 
Mayer, 36 Hastings Const L Q at 217–22 (cited in note 3) (same). 
 18 David E. Bernstein, The History of “Substantive” Due Process: It’s Complicated, 95 
Tex L Rev See Also 1, 3 (2016). 
 19 See, for example, James W. Ely Jr, The Guardian of Every Other Right: A Consti-
tutional History of Property Rights 79 (Oxford 3d ed 2008) (describing as a “substantive 
interpretation[ ] of due process” the invalidation of “legislative attempts to transfer pri-
vate property from one party to another”); Williams, 120 Yale L J at 423–27 (cited in 
note 2) (providing a taxonomy of different versions of substantive due process); id at 460–
77 (analyzing cases supporting the general law and vested rights reading of due process). 
 20 Chapman and McConnell, 121 Yale L J at 1726–73 (cited in note 1). 
 21 Mayer describes any restriction imposed by due process and law of the land clauses 
on legislation to be “substantive.” Mayer, 60 Mercer L Rev at 586–87 (cited in note 3). See 
also, for example, Siegan, 22 San Diego L Rev at 488–89 (cited in note 3) (suggesting that 
by operating “directly in limitation and restraint of the legislative powers conferred by the 
Constitution,” the Due Process Clause was substantive), quoting Hepburn v Griswold, 75 
US (8 Wall) 603, 624 (1869). 
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concern. The question rather is whether the guarantee of due pro-
cess of law allowed courts to strike down legislative acts incon-
sistent with unwritten fundamental rights. 
One might think that none of this history matters for modern 
law. Yet at a minimum it matters to the debates over interpretive 
methodology—both those internal to originalism, the idea that 
the Constitution ought to be interpreted with its original mean-
ing,22 and those external to it. Barnett and Bernick’s recent work, 
for example, demonstrates significant disagreement among 
originalists themselves over methodology. Do originalists merely 
look to the original public meaning of the words—do they stop at 
“interpretation”—or must they resort to “construction” if the con-
stitutional provisions prove to be too open-ended? And if the lat-
ter, are the historical constructions of prior generations relevant 
to the question of what constructions to adopt in modern times?23 
The historical evidence here suggests that the distinction be-
tween interpretation and construction may not do much work in 
the context of due process because the due process concept was 
not as broad and open-ended as the substantive due process the-
sis suggests. 
This history may also matter to modern law more directly. 
The cases suggest that, historically, states were limited to good-
faith and legitimate exercises of their police powers when state 
power ran up against potential federal constitutional prohibi-
tions. After the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted, the states 
became subject to new federal constitutional prohibitions, namely 
 
 22 For some summaries of originalism and the current state of the debate, see Ilan 
Wurman, A Debt Against the Living: An Introduction to Originalism 11–21, 25–44, 84–96 
(Cambridge 2017). See also generally Keith E. Whittington, Originalism: A Critical Intro-
duction, 82 Fordham L Rev 375 (2013). For a summary of the debates internal to original-
ism, which arguably weaken originalism’s claim to legitimacy, see generally Thomas B. 
Colby and Peter J. Smith, Living Originalism, 59 Duke L J 239 (2009). 
 23 Barnett and Bernick look not only to the letter, but also to the “spirit” of the con-
stitutional provisions. See Barnett and Bernick, 60 Wm & Mary L Rev at 1605 (cited in 
note 5). They explain that nineteenth-century courts “constructed” the police-powers doc-
trine because due process of law had come to be “understood to impose limits on the ends 
which state legislatures could pursue.” Id at 1631 (emphasis in original). They conclude 
that the Fourteenth Amendment does not “compel[ ]” this precise police-power doctrine—
because it is a construction—but that the Amendment requires some “conception of the 
legitimate ends of government that is consistent with the original function—the spirit—of 
the Due Process of Law Clause in the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id at 1638. In contrast, 
Professors John McGinnis and Michael Rappaport claim that the legal methods in use at 
the Founding saw no distinction between interpretation and construction. See John O. 
McGinnis and Michael B. Rappaport, Original Methods Originalism: A New Theory of In-
terpretation and the Case Against Construction, 103 Nw U L Rev 751, 772–80 (2009). 
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the Privileges or Immunities Clause and a variety of incorporated 
rights. Although police powers may not be relevant to due process 
(or so I argue), they very well may be relevant to a proper analysis 
of these new federal constitutional prohibitions. The Privileges or 
Immunities Clause, for example, provides that no state shall 
“abridge” the privileges or immunities of citizenship.24 This provi-
sion thus directly limits the states, just as do the Contracts and 
Commerce Clauses. Whatever the clause forbids—whether 
abridgement of fundamental rights generally, or only unequal 
state legislation—a defense against a Privileges or Immunities 
Clause claim could be that the state was not “abridging” such priv-
ileges or immunities but was rather acting pursuant to its proper 
police powers. This argument would work by analogy to the ante-
bellum Commerce Clause and Contracts Clause jurisprudence.25 
The same kind of analysis might apply to incorporated rights, 
too, and in fact appears to have been the Supreme Court’s frame-
work in First Amendment cases in the first few decades after that 
amendment was incorporated. And, now that the Supreme Court 
has heard a Second Amendment case26 for the first time since that 
amendment was incorporated,27 the police-powers framework 
could supply the Court with a framework for such cases, too. 
This Article unfolds as follows. Part I traces the history of  
police-power limitations on municipal corporations and states, 
surveying the municipal corporations, commerce, and contracts 
cases. It ends with a brief discussion of the provenance and impli-
cations of the two famous (or infamous) historical exceptions to 
my claim of which I am aware, Dred Scott v Sandford28 and 
Wynehamer v People.29 
Part II examines Michigan Supreme Court Justice Thomas 
Cooley’s Constitutional Limitations30 treatise to support these 
conclusions. Cooley’s textbook is particularly important because 
it was published contemporaneously with the adoption of the 
 
 24 US Const Amend XIV, § 1, cl 2. 
 25 See Part IV. 
 26 New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc v City of New York, 883 F3d 45 (2d 
Cir 2018), cert granted, 139 S Ct 939 (2019). 
 27 See McDonald v City of Chicago, 561 US 742, 791 (2010) (Alito) (plurality) (“[T]he 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the Second Amendment 
right recognized in Heller.”). 
 28 60 US (19 How) 393 (1857). 
 29 13 NY 378 (1856). 
 30 See generally Cooley, Treatise on Constitutional Limitations (cited in note 3). 
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Fourteenth Amendment,31 and his treatise was well known and 
well received32 because no one had previously compiled such a 
thorough set of state constitutional cases.33 As we shall see, the 
Supreme Court and litigants before it relied on Cooley after the 
adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment.34 Cooley’s text is also 
important because almost all proponents of substantive due 
process rely heavily on statements from Cooley as supporting 
the existence of antebellum substantive due process.35 Yet,  
 
 31 Originalists generally look to evidence nearest in time to the enactment of a par-
ticular constitutional provision. Consider, for example, Michael W. McConnell, The Ori-
gins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion, 103 Harv L Rev 1409, 1513 
(1990) (“None of these decisions was handed down within twenty years of the first amend-
ment, and they are therefore weak indicators of the original understanding.”). 
 32 See, for example, Ely, 16 Const Commen at 342 (cited in note 3) (describing Cooley 
as “the most influential constitutional writer of the late nineteenth century”); Mayer, 36 
Hastings Const L Q at 233 n 71 (cited in note 3) (describing Cooley’s treatise as “the most 
influential constitutional law treatise in the nineteenth century”); Williams, 120 Yale L J at 
493 (cited in note 2) (describing Cooley as “[b]y far the most influential of the early post-Civil 
War commentators to address the meaning of due process and law-of-the-land provisions”). 
 33 See Jacobs, Law Writers and the Courts at 29–30 (cited in note 17): 
Why did Cooley’s treatise surpass even those of Kent and Story in prestige and 
authority? . . . First, [it] was the first systematic work of merit in the field of 
state constitutional law. It served, as no previous work had done, to bring order 
out of the confusion inherent in having a large number of separate, although 
basically similar, constitutional systems. It soon became the ready-made refer-
ence work, the hand-book, of lawyers and judges. Second, the fact that the trea-
tise, as its title indicates, emphasized limitations upon power rather than power 
itself made it readily compatible with prevailing economic and political ideas of 
the time. 
 34 See Part III. 
 35 Professor James Ely argues that Cooley “embraced a substantive understanding 
of due process in his landmark work,” explaining that due process “was intended to safe-
guard individuals from the arbitrary exercise of governmental power.” Ely, 16 Const Com-
men at 342 (cited in note 3). Williams argues that “Cooley’s focus on the legitimacy of the 
legislature’s objectives and the means pursued to attain those objectives corresponds 
closely with the police powers version of due process that predominated during the  
Lochner era,” and that “Cooley is frequently credited as one of the principal intellectual 
forerunners of Lochner-era substantive due process jurisprudence.” Williams, 120 Yale L 
J at 494 (cited in note 2). Mayer cites Cooley for the proposition that “state courts in the 
nineteenth century understood the general regulatory power of the states known as the 
‘police power’ to be broad but certainly not unlimited.” Mayer, 36 Hastings Const L Q at 
233 & n 71 (cited in note 3). He also argues that Cooley’s treatise defined the police power 
as the general regulatory power of the state to “insure to each the uninterrupted enjoy-
ment of his own so far as is reasonably consistent with a like enjoyment of the rights by 
others.” Id at n 71, quoting Thomas M. Cooley, A Treatise on the Constitutional Limita-
tions Which Rest upon the Legislative Power of the States of the American Union 704 (Lit-
tle, Brown 6th ed 1890). And Gillman extensively discusses Cooley for the proposition that 
states could only interfere with property rights if genuinely for police-power purposes. See 
Gillman, The Constitution Besieged at 56–59 (cited in note 3). See also, for example,  
Sandefur, 5 NYU J L & Liberty at 154 (cited in note 3) (claiming that Cooley’s “famous 
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quite the opposite is true. Part II, in short, seeks to rehabilitate 
Cooley.36 
Part III will trace the emergence of substantive due process 
in the conflation of these distinct strands of legal doctrine in the 
federal cases interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment after the 
Slaughter-House Cases, culminating in Lochner v New York.37 It 
concludes that economic substantive due process cannot be sup-
ported on the basis of the antebellum antecedents on which the 
Supreme Court purported to rely. 
Part IV suggests, however, that the police powers could be 
relevant to a proper analysis of the Privileges or Immunities 
Clause and also of incorporated rights. Whether one adopts the 
fundamental rights reading or the equality reading of the Privi-
leges or Immunities Clause, a state may, by analogy to Contracts 
and Commerce Clause jurisprudence, be able to defend against a 
claim of “abridgement” on the ground that it was pursuing a le-
gitimate police-power interest. The same kind of defense could 
also be made by a state defending against a claim that it has vio-
lated an incorporated right. This Part illustrates these possibili-
ties through a reexamination of the Slaughter-House Cases and 
early post-incorporation First Amendment cases. 
I.  THE ANTEBELLUM LEGAL DOCTRINES 
The police powers featured in three antebellum doctrines: 
municipal corporations were limited to reasonable regulations for 
genuine police-power purposes, states were limited to genuine 
 police-power regulations that affected interstate commerce, and 
both state and local governments could not impair existing con-
tractual obligations except for genuine police-power reasons. The 
police-power cases generally cited by scholars fall into one of these 
three categories, none of which appears to support substantive 
due process of the kind advanced by the Supreme Court after the 
adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment or by some modern  
scholars. 
 
treatise” concluded that “the Due Process Clause protected substantive rights against un-
principled or arbitrary legislation”). 
 36 The title of this Part is inspired by Siegan’s “Rehabilitating Lochner” article, as 
well as Bernstein’s Rehabilitating Lochner. See generally Siegan, 22 San Diego L Rev 453 
(cited in note 3); Bernstein, Rehabilitating Lochner (cited in note 3). 
 37 198 US 45 (1905). See also Part III.A. Lochner, of course, is the most infamous 
case of the bunch—the case striking down a state law limiting the number of hours that 
bakers could work. Lochner, 198 US at 45–46, 57–58. 
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A. The Police Powers of Municipal Corporations 
In the antebellum period, most legislation regulating the 
health, safety, welfare, and morals of the people was made at the 
local level by cities, towns, and boroughs. By the time of the Civil 
War, a large body of law had developed governing the appropriate 
use of local legislation and the judicial review of such legislation. 
The treatises and cases focus on two general principles. First, mu-
nicipalities could exercise only those powers expressly delegated 
to them by the state legislatures, or those necessarily implied or 
incidental. Second, courts could review municipal acts for reason-
ableness, to ensure they were not in restraint of trade, and to en-
sure they were genuinely intended to advance the purposes of the 
municipal corporation—that is, their police-power purposes—just 
as courts reviewed the acts of private corporations. 
Notably, many of the cases involved matters that to this day 
create controversy. One example is the regulation of interment 
practices, which was recently at issue in a case from Louisiana.38 
Another is the regulation of slaughterhouses, including the crea-
tion of monopolies—the very issue at the heart of the Slaughter-
House Cases.39 Courts reviewed these regulations to determine if 
they were reasonable, consistent with the police powers, and not 
in restraint of trade. But if a state permitted a municipal corpo-
ration to create any particular regulation or even monopoly ex-
pressly—or if the state did so itself—there does not appear to 
have been any doctrine courts could employ to ensure the reason-
ableness of such laws or ordinances, nor their consistency with a 
proper use of the police power. 
1. State-court cases. 
One of the most lucid and thorough cases from the antebel-
lum period is City of St. Paul v Laidler40 out of Minnesota. The 
city enacted an ordinance prohibiting the sale or exposure for sale 
of fresh meat at any time and place except in the public market.41 
The city would rent out stalls in the public market to the highest 
 
 38 St. Joseph Abbey v Castille, 712 F3d 215, 217 (5th Cir 2013). In one of the few 
successful economic substantive due process challenges since the New Deal, the Fifth Cir-
cuit struck down a Louisiana licensing scheme creating exclusive privileges for funeral 
homes to create and sell caskets. Id at 217. 
 39 See Part IV.B. 
 40 2 Minn 190 (1858). 
 41 Id at 201–02. 
2020] The Origins of Substantive Due Process 827 
 
bidder, with a minimum rent established by the ordinance.42 The 
city’s charter expressly granted it the power to “establish a public 
market,” to “make rules and regulations for the government of the 
same,” and to “license and regulate butcher stall shops.”43 
The state supreme court first explained that municipal cor-
porations were bodies of specifically delegated powers: 
The City of Saint Paul is a municipal corporation, organized 
and established to accomplish certain purposes and objects 
particularly specified in its charter. The city government de-
rives its power and authority to make and enforce laws for 
the government of the city solely from the legislature. It is 
entirely a creature of the Statute and in the exercise of its 
authority cannot exceed the limits therein prescribed. It is a 
body of special and limited jurisdiction; its powers cannot be 
extended by intendment or implication, but must be confined 
within the express grant of the legislature.44 
Municipal corporations are organized and established for “certain 
purposes and objects,” usually defined expressly in the corporate 
charter.45 Moreover, the court went on, such power must be exer-
cised reasonably: 
[N]ot only so, but this power must be exercised reasonably 
and in sound discretion, and strictly within the limits of the 
Charter, and in perfect subordination to the Constitution and 
general laws of the land, and the rights dependent thereon 
and where the Charter enables a company or corporation to 
make by-laws (or ordinances) in certain cases and for certain 
purposes, its power of legislation is limited to the cases and 
objects specified; all others being excluded by implication.46 
The court explained that “[i]ncidental to the ordinary powers 
of a public municipal corporation” is the “power of enacting sani-
tary regulations for the preservation of the lives and health of 
those residing within its corporate limits,” but that the corpora-
tion must “exercise no power further than may be necessary to 
attain it.”47 In particular, all sides agreed that if the ordinance 
 
 42 Id at 201–03. 
 43 Id at 203, quoting St. Paul City Charter §§ 18–19 (1858). 
 44 Laidler, 2 Minn at 203. 
 45 Id. 
 46 Id at 204 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
 47 Id. 
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were a restraint of trade rather than a mere regulation of trade, 
it would be void.48 
The court concluded that the ordinance was void for being in 
restraint of trade, unreasonable, and contrary to the purposes of 
the corporation.49 The ordinance could not be sustained as neces-
sary for sanitation because no such necessity justified granting a 
public monopoly to certain sellers only.50 Further, there were no 
rules confining the discretion of the public officials who granted 
the licenses to sell; they “might be granted only to political parti-
zans, or personal friends.”51 Thus, the power to license could be 
exercised “arbitrarily or unreasonably.”52 
The court also concluded that the ordinance was not for the 
common benefit of the people, noting that it was “difficult to see 
how such an ordinance can operate for the common benefit, or the 
benefit of any one save the corporation; for its legitimate effect 
must be, to increase the price of the commodity sold in proportion 
to the restrictions imposed upon those engaged in the trade,” and 
thus the ordinance “must operate not only to the prejudice of the 
butchers but also to that of the citizens in general.”53 The court, 
in its penultimate paragraph, thus found that the ordinance was 
“in restraint of trade,” “unreasonable,” not genuinely for police-
power purposes, and in violation of the state’s delegation of power 
to the corporation: 
[T]he ordinance . . . cannot be sustained upon principle or au-
thority. And, while the right is conceded to municipal corpo-
rations to adopt such regulations as may be necessary and 
reasonable, to protect the lives, health, property or morals of 
its citizens, the exercise of this right should be carefully 
guarded, and limited within the clear intent of the grant of 
power for such purpose; and, where a question arises as to 
any particular ordinance which it is claimed interferes with 
the rights of individuals as enjoyed under the common law or 
by statute, the burden of proof should be on the corporation 
to show that it has not exceeded its authority in framing such 
ordinance.54 
 
 48 Laidler, 2 Minn at 203–05. 
 49 Id at 209. 
 50 Id at 205. 
 51 Id at 206. 
 52 Laidler, 2 Minn at 209. 
 53 Id at 209. 
 54 Id. 
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Numerous cases from the antebellum period hold similarly. 
The rationale, as appears from the above case, is partly a theory 
of delegation from the state. One justice in North Carolina ex-
plained, “To this [corporate] body a portion of the power of the 
legislature is delegated to be exercised for the public good, and 
subject at all times to be modified, changed, or annulled.”55 An-
other rationale was the applicability of the common law of corpo-
rations. Chief Justice John Savage of New York’s Supreme Court 
of Judicature explained, “At common law corporations have 
power to make by-laws for the general good of the corporation. 
They must be reasonable and for the common benefit; they must 
not be in restraint of trade, nor impose a burden without an ap-
parent benefit.”56 The only question in that case, which involved 
a municipal bylaw, was therefore whether that bylaw was valid 
pursuant to those principles.57 “The authority of the corporation 
is a limited one,” an earlier New York case explained.58 “The trus-
tees cannot arbitrarily pass what laws they please. Their laws are 
to be prudential; and aimed at the correction of some probable 
evil. This is also conformable to the general law of corporations, 
which demands that their by-laws should be reasonable.”59 
Perhaps Chief Justice John Marshall best gave expression to 
both of these grounds, with his usual clarity and concision: “Being 
the mere creature of law, [a corporation] possesses only those 
properties which the charter of its creation confers upon it, either 
expressly, or as incidental to its very existence. These are such as 
are supposed best calculated to effect the object for which it was 
created.”60 Judge John F. Dillon’s 1872 treatise on municipal cor-
porations—which we shall discuss in more detail presently—ex-
plained that these principles were applicable to “private as well 
as public or municipal” corporations.61 Thus, in 1854 one corpora-
tions treatise writer wrote that the bylaws of municipal corpora-
tions must be “reasonable and adapted to the purposes of the  
corporation.”62 
 
 55 Mills v Williams, 33 NC (11 Ired) 558, 561 (1850). 
 56 Village of Buffalo v Webster, 10 Wend 100, 102 (NY 1833). 
 57 Id. 
 58 Dunham v Trustees of the Village of Rochester, 5 Cow 462, 465 (NY 1826). 
 59 Id (emphasis added). 
 60 Trustees of Dartmouth College v Woodward, 17 US (4 Wheat) 518, 636 (1819). 
 61 John F. Dillon, Treatise on the Law of Municipal Corporations 27–28 (Cockcroft & 
Co 1872). 
 62 James Grant, A Practical Treatise on the Law of Corporations in General, as Well 
Aggregate as Sole 86 (T. & J.W. Johnson 1854). 
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These principles were applied by the Supreme Judicial Court 
of Massachusetts in 1834 to invalidate a bylaw in Charlestown 
that entirely prohibited the bringing of dead bodies into the town 
without the approval of a majority of the selectmen, and further 
prohibited them from burying any dead body in the town without 
the approval of the same.63 The first ordinance was struck down 
for being outside the scope of the corporation’s delegated power 
because “[t]here is nothing in the language of the statute, from 
which it can be inferred, that it was the intention of the legisla-
ture to delegate to the selectmen and town of Charlestown the 
power of imposing upon the citizens of the Commonwealth such 
an unreasonable restraint.”64 
The second ordinance respecting the burial of the dead, how-
ever, was struck down on other grounds. The statute authorized 
the municipal corporation “to make and establish rules, orders, 
and regulations for the interment of the dead in said town, to es-
tablish the police of the burying-grounds, to make regulations for 
funerals, and to appoint all necessary officers to carry the same 
into effect.”65 The court first held that the bylaw was not merely a 
regulation, but a complete prohibition. Indeed, it appears to have 
been the intent of the town to prohibit all Catholic burials.66 
The court also held that even if such a bylaw were a regula-
tion and not a complete prohibition, it would still be void because 
it was unreasonable and not genuinely for a police-power purpose. 
“A by-law, to be valid, must be reasonable; it must be legi, fidei, 
rationi consona,” the court observed. 67 Thus, if this “regulation or 
prohibition had been limited to the populous part of the town, and 
were made in good faith for the purpose of preserving the health of 
the inhabitants,” who may be exposed to disease as a result of in-
terments in densely populated areas, then “it would have been a 
very reasonable regulation.”68 But because the “restraints extend 
 
 63 Austin v Murray, 33 Mass (16 Pick) 121, 124 (1834). 
 64 Id. Here, the court adds: “[N]or had the legislature any right or authority to dele-
gate any such power.” Id. There are no citations for this proposition, and it appears to have 
been a minority view. Indeed, numerous cases held that a state could ratify unreasonable 
ordinances or explicitly delegate the power to enact unreasonable ordinances. See notes 
83–85, 98, and accompanying text. Even if it were true that the legislature had no power 
to delegate to municipalities the authority to enact unreasonable regulations, that does 
not support the proposition that the state itself could not have enacted the unreasonable 
regulation. 
 65 Austin, 33 Mass (16 Pick) at 124. 
 66 Id at 124–25. 
 67 Id at 125. 
 68 Id (emphasis added). 
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many miles into the country, to the utmost limits of the town,” it 
could not “be pretended that this by-law was made for the preser-
vation of the health of the inhabitants.”69 “[S]uch an unnecessary 
restraint upon the right of interring the dead,” the justices con-
cluded, “we think essentially unreasonable.”70 
Here we see a hint of the kind of language that would become 
a staple of police-power limitations against the states in the 1870s 
and after. It was the duty of courts, at least when reviewing mu-
nicipal acts, to ensure that they were “made in good faith for the 
purpose of” genuinely advancing the health, safety, welfare, or 
morals of the people.71 Numerous other cases from the period, 
from numerous states, adopted these same principles.72 
2. Dillon on municipal corporations. 
The earliest synthesis of the antebellum cases appears to be 
Judge Dillon’s Treatise on the Law of Municipal Corporations, 
published in 1872. Dillon was a judge of the US Court of Appeals 
for the Eighth Circuit at the time he published the treatise, and 
had been a justice of the Iowa Supreme Court for half a decade in 
the 1860s.73 His treatise is of particular interest not only because 
 
 69 Austin, 33 Mass (16 Pick) at 125. 
 70 Id. 
 71 Id. 
 72 See, for example, Waters v Leech, 3 Ark 110, 114–15 (1840): 
The corporation of the city of Little Rock possesses only such legislative powers 
as are prescribed by the charter from which it derives its existence. It exercises 
a delegated power only; and must in all its acts, confine itself strictly within the 
limits of its authority. . . . The power to make by-laws is given to corporate bodies 
to enable them to fulfil the purposes of the institution, and must necessarily be 
confined to such objects and persons as are specially defined in the charter. The 
corporate powers are not only limited, but must be reasonably exercised in sound 
discretion, and not only strictly within the limits of the charter, but in perfect 
subordination to the constitution and the general law of the land, and the rights 
dependent thereon; and that power, if properly exercised, may be enforced by 
just and competent penalties. 
See also Borough of Greensburg v Young, 53 Pa 280, 283 (1866):  
There is nothing therefore to restrain the authorities in regard to these rules, 
regulations and ordinances which they make on the subject of the streets, but 
the constitution and laws of the Commonwealth, and the common law, which 
requires the by-laws of the corporation to be reasonable and not a burden, with-
out some fair equivalent.  
For an account of the broad police powers exercised by municipalities, see generally  
William J. Novak, The People’s Welfare: Law and Regulation in Nineteenth-Century Amer-
ica (UNC 3d ed 1996). 
 73 Harry Hubbard, John F. Dillon: Fourteenth President of Association, 14 ABA 
J 77 (1928). 
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it supports the above analysis on a wider scale, but also for two 
further reasons. First, as we shall see presently, his treatise 
teems with suggestions that state legislatures were not limited 
by the police powers the same way municipal corporations were 
limited. Second, notwithstanding these suggestions, litigants be-
fore the Supreme Court cited Dillon’s treatise in the 1870s and 
afterward for the proposition that states themselves were limited 
by the police powers, an argument that appears to have per-
suaded some of the justices. 
Dillon’s focus is primarily on the limited nature of a munici-
pal corporation’s delegated powers. “The courts,” he wrote, have 
the most important duty “to require these [municipal] corpora-
tions, in all cases, to show a plain and clear grant for the authority 
they assume to exercise.”74 Municipal corporations “possess no 
powers or faculties not conferred upon them, either expressly or 
by fair implication, by the law which creates them, or other stat-
utes applicable to them.”75 
In addition to acting only pursuant to their delegated powers, 
municipal corporations also had to act solely for the public bene-
fit. “Municipal corporations are created and exist for the public 
advantage, and not for the benefit of their officers or of particular 
individuals or classes.”76 Many general state laws explicitly di-
rected for this reason that any municipal act must be “necessary” 
for the attainment of only certain enumerated objects.77 Dillon 
cites numerous cases for this proposition. To take but one exam-
ple, he cites Chief Justice Lemuel Shaw of the Massachusetts Su-
preme Judicial Court for the proposition “that corporations can 
only exercise their powers over their respective members, for the 
accomplishment of limited and defined objects.”78 Thus, municipal 
 
 74 Dillon, Treatise on the Law of Municipal Corporations at 25 (cited in note 61). 
 75 Id at 29. See also id at 40 (when it comes to entering into municipal contracts, 
“[t]he power of the majority is wisely limited by law to the objects and cases which are 
clearly provided for and defined by statute”); id at 101–02 (asserting that it is a “general 
and undisputed proposition” that a municipal corporation can exercise only powers that 
are (1) “granted in express words,” (2) “necessarily or fairly implied in, or incident to, the 
powers expressly granted,” or (3) “essential to the declared objects and purposes of the 
corporation—not simply convenient, but indispensable”). 
 76 Id at 29. 
 77 See, for example, id at 34–35 n 1 (observing that Massachusetts’s general law per-
mitted cities to make only those bylaws “necessary . . . for directing and managing the 
prudential affairs, preserving the peace and good order, and maintaining the internal  
police”).  
 78 Dillon, Treatise on the Law of Municipal Corporations at 102 (cited in note 61), 
quoting Spaulding v Lowell, 40 Mass (23 Pick) 71, 74 (1839). 
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bylaws and ordinances enacted pursuant to a general or implied 
grant of power “must be reasonable” and “consonant with the gen-
eral powers and purposes of the corporation.”79 Satisfaction of this 
criterion is for the courts to judge: “Whether an ordinance be rea-
sonable and consistent with the law or not, is a question for the 
court”; “[a]n unreasonable by-law is void.”80 Courts, however, 
must “cautiously” exercise this power because “city authorities, it 
is to be presumed, can judge better than the court.”81 
Judge Dillon’s synthesis thus supports the proposition that 
courts could void municipal acts that were unreasonable, in re-
straint of trade, contrary to a delegation of power, or inconsistent 
with the purposes of such a delegation. But, crucially, no such 
doctrines would prevent a state legislature from exercising its 
own powers unreasonably or in restraint of trade. Indeed, Judge 
Dillon lamented that “[e]xtraordinary and extra-municipal pow-
ers have been too often incautiously or unwisely granted” by the 
state legislatures to cities, and exhorted his readers that “[t]he 
powers granted to such corporations, and especially the power to 
levy taxes, should be more carefully defined and limited, and 
should embrace such objects only as are necessary for the health, 
welfare, safety, and convenience of the inhabitants.”82 This sug-
gests his understanding that states ultimately could authorize lo-
cal governments to act contrary to the genuine health, welfare, 
safety, and convenience of citizens—even if the courts would in-
validate an improper municipal act made pursuant to more gen-
eral grants of authority. 
Judge Dillon elsewhere makes this understanding explicit. 
Under the heading, “Legislative Authority to Adopt Unreasonable 
Ordinances,” he writes: 
Where the legislature, in terms, confers upon a municipal 
corporation the power to pass ordinances of a specified and 
defined character, if the power thus delegated be not in con-
flict with the constitution, an ordinance passed pursuant 
thereto cannot be impeached as invalid because it would have 
been regarded as unreasonable if it had been passed under 
the incidental power of the corporation, or under a grant of 
 
 79 Dillon, Treatise on the Law of Municipal Corporations at 278 (cited in note 61). 
 80 Id at 283. 
 81 Id at 283–84 n 3, citing Commonwealth v Robertson, 59 Mass (5 Cush) 438,  
442 (1850). 
 82 Dillon, Treatise on the Law of Municipal Corporations at 23 (emphasis added) 
(cited in note 61). 
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power general in its nature. In other words, what the legisla-
ture distinctly says may be done cannot be set aside by the 
courts because they may deem it unreasonable.83 
Only “where the power to legislate on a given subject is con-
ferred, but the mode of its exercise is not prescribed, then the or-
dinance passed in pursuance thereof must be a reasonable exer-
cise of the power, or it will be pronounced invalid.”84 Put simply, 
if the legislature explicitly granted a municipal corporation the 
power to do an unreasonable act, it was not for the courts to ques-
tion it.85 
One illustrative case involving slaughterhouses—a case with 
very similar facts to those in the Slaughter-House Cases, and cited 
there by counsel and the dissenters86—was City of Chicago v 
Rumpff,87 decided the year before the adoption of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Chicago granted a ten-year monopoly starting in 
 
 83 Id at 284 (emphasis added). 
 84 Id. 
 85 The two cases Judge Dillon cited for this proposition do not make the point quite 
so explicitly, but they do support it. See id at 284. In City of Peoria v Calhoun, 29 Ill 317 
(1862), the Illinois Supreme Court held to be erroneous an instruction to the jury that 
seemed to suggest that a restraint of trade was unlawful even if the municipal corporation 
had been granted the power to enact such a restraint. Id at 320. “This was virtually telling 
the jury,” the court observed, “that although the city had the right to pass the ordinance, 
yet if they believed it was in restraint of lawful trade, it was not binding. If the city had 
power to pass the ordinance, then no trade in violation of it could be lawful.” Id. 
 The Minnesota Supreme Court in City of St. Paul v Colter, 12 Minn 41 (1866), was 
more explicit. The state legislature authorized the city to regulate the sale of meat and to 
require a license to be purchased at a price anywhere from $5 to $500. Id at 46–47. The 
defendant argued that an ordinance imposing a $200 license fee was “unauthorized and 
void, and oppressive and in restraint of trade”; that the corporation’s powers “are confined 
to sanitary and police regulations”; and, most importantly, that “[t]he legislature of the 
State cannot authorize a corporation to pass by-laws, save only such as are reasonable.” 
Id at 43–44. The court had no trouble rejecting the argument: “What limits should be im-
posed upon the licensing power, was a matter for the legislature to determine,—a matter 
dependent upon the judgment and discretion of the legislature. In such case we do not 
think it proper to question the exercise of legislative discretion.” Id at 48. The court em-
phasized that the ordinance in that case was “authorized by the legislature,” and “not 
being forbidden by the constitution, it is therefore not void, but has the force of law; and if 
it be oppressive, the remedy, as in many other cases, lies with the legislature or common 
council.” Id at 49 (emphasis in original). Because the ordinance was within the corpora-
tion’s explicitly delegated power, the ordinance was presumed valid, and the presumption 
could not be overcome “by any thing going to show that the imposition of the license [was] 
. . . not warranted by . . . the legitimate purposes for which such charters may be granted.” 
Id. An authorization by the state legislature insulated a municipal act that might other-
wise have been invalid under the police-powers analysis. 
 86 Slaughter-House Cases, 83 US (16 Wall) at 48; id at 106–07 (Field dissenting). See 
also Part IV.B.2. 
 87 45 Ill 90 (1867). 
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1866 to one particular company over all slaughtering in the city 
pursuant to a grant of power in its charter to “direct the location, 
management and construction of, and to regulate, license, re-
strain, abate and prohibit [slaughtering establishments] within 
the city.”88 The state legislature attempted to ratify the contract 
in 1867 by amending the charter to provide the city with “power 
and authority to regulate and control the slaughtering of all ani-
mals in the city, or within four miles thereof, intended for con-
sumption or exposed for sale in the city, and to enforce, by addi-
tional ordinances, any regulation, contract or law heretofore 
made on the subject.”89 
The Illinois Supreme Court struck down the ordinance.90 
“Municipal corporations are only created for the better govern-
ment and protection of local communities in the enjoyment of 
their rights, than can be afforded by general laws,” the court ob-
served.91 “Such bodies are never created to enable them to confer 
pecuniary benefits, or to grant monopolies to any portion of com-
munity, or to individual members thereof.”92 They are created “for 
the regulation of the local police; to adopt and enforce all needful 
sanitary regulations; to establish and control markets; to repair 
highways, and perform the various other duties necessary to pro-
mote the comfort and well being of such densely crowded commu-
nities as constitute large cities.”93 But, the court went on to say, 
it is no part of the design, in organizing such bodies, that the 
corporate authorities shall enter into competition with its in-
habitants in business or trade, or to sell, or even grant, spe-
cial immunities to any portion of the inhabitants for their in-
dividual benefit or gain. The corporate authorities must 
exercise their franchises solely for the benefit of the commu-
nity embraced within their limits.94 
Here the court clearly stated both the evils of monopoly and 
the limitations upon a municipal corporation’s exercise of its po-
lice powers. Such powers must be exercised for the benefit of the 
whole and not for the private advantage of a select few. The ends 
pursued must be legitimately for the safety and health of the 
 
 88 Id at 92–95. 
 89 Id at 95, quoting Chicago City Charter, ch v, § 24 (1867). 
 90 Rumpff, 45 Ill at 97–98. 
 91 Id at 96. 
 92 Id. 
 93 Id. 
 94 Rumpff, 45 Ill at 96. 
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community. “Hence their by-laws must be reasonable, and such 
as are vexatious, unequal or oppressive, or are manifestly injuri-
ous to the interest of the corporation, are void, and of the same 
character are all by-laws in restraint of trade, or which neces-
sarily tend to create a monopoly.”95 
The court also rejected the state legislature’s attempt to rat-
ify this unreasonable ordinance because the legislature had not 
done so expressly. “[I]nasmuch as this contract is not specifically 
named,” the court held, “we cannot presume that the legislature 
intended to ratify an unreasonable and oppressive contract, but 
only such as was in accordance with the purposes for which the 
charter had been granted, and not those which were opposed to 
the design of creating such bodies.”96  
This holding implies two important points. First, it appears 
that the court was prepared to presume the legislature did not act 
unreasonably or contrary to legitimate police-power purposes. As 
we shall see, this was consistent with other courts using a version 
of what we might today call substantive due process as a rule of 
statutory construction.97 But, second, it seems that the court 
would not have struck down an express ratification of the unrea-
sonable ordinance.98 In sum, Dillon and the antebellum cases uni-
formly maintained that, absent an express authorization to the 
contrary, municipal corporations were limited to reasonable exer-
cises of the police powers under the law of delegation and the law 
of corporations. State legislatures, however, do not appear to have 
been limited in this same way. 
 
 95 Id at 97. The court articulated what would have made such an ordinance a valid 
exercise of the police power: “Where that body have made the necessary regulations re-
quired for the health or comfort of the inhabitants, all persons inclined to pursue such an 
occupation should have the opportunity of conforming to such regulations, otherwise the 
ordinance would be unreasonable and tend to oppression.” Id. In other words, a regulation 
of slaughterhouses would have been legitimate so long as anyone in the occupation had a 
fair chance of conforming to the regulations. “We regard it neither as a regulation nor a 
license of the business,” on the other hand, “to confine it to one building, or to give it to 
one individual. Such action is oppressive, and creates a monopoly that never could have 
been contemplated by the general assembly.” Id at 98. It cuts others “off from a share in 
not only a legal but a necessary business.” Id. Thus, whether the court considered the city’s 
act to be an ordinance or a contract (which was at issue in the case), “it is equally unau-
thorized, as being opposed to the rules governing the adoption of municipal by-laws.” Id. 
 96 Id at 98–99. 
 97 See Part II.C. 
 98 Dillon elsewhere states that when “an ordinance is unreasonable, [it] can only be 
passed when clearly authorized.” Dillon, Treatise on the Law of Municipal Corporations at 
333 (cited in note 61), citing Waters v Leech, 3 Ark 110 (1840). 
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B. Police Powers and State Regulations of Commerce 
The state legislatures may not have been limited to reasona-
ble exercises of their police powers as a general matter, but they 
were so limited when their exercise of power came into potential 
collision with specific federal constitutional provisions. 
One such provision was the prohibition on state regulations 
of interstate commerce under the exclusive reading of the Com-
merce Clause. One of the pressing constitutional questions of the 
era was whether the commerce power was exclusive and prohib-
ited state regulations of interstate commerce and, if it was exclu-
sive, whether that also prohibited state health and safety regula-
tions that affected interstate commerce. In these cases, the police 
powers did serve as a limitation on the states. The Court allowed 
states to regulate articles of interstate commerce only if their reg-
ulations were genuinely for police-power purposes.99 
1. Gibbons v Ogden (1824). 
Our story begins with a prominent case of early constitu-
tional law, Gibbons v Ogden.100 The facts are familiar. Ogden was 
the assignee of exclusive licenses to navigate state waters by 
steamboat granted by the state legislature of New York, and  
Gibbons was licensed under an act of Congress to engage in the 
“coasting trade.”101 Ogden sued Gibbons for violating Ogden’s ex-
clusive state license. The question was whether the federal gov-
ernment had the power under the Commerce Clause to regulate 
the coasting trade and, if so, whether that power was exclusive of 
state legislation on the same subject.102 
The attorneys argued about the nature of the state’s police 
powers and their relationship to the Commerce Clause. All agreed 
on the principle. Daniel Webster, arguing for Gibbons, made the 
case for the exclusivity of the federal commerce power, but argued 
that an exclusive power was not inconsistent with the state’s rec-
ognized power over “pilot laws, the health laws, or quarantine 
 
 99 Professor David Currie argued that the Court never provided explicit and clear 
answers to the exclusivity question. See, for example, David P. Currie, The Constitution 
in the Supreme Court: The First Hundred Years, 1789–1888 168–76, 204–06, 222–34, 330–
42 (Chicago 1985). However, this Article’s examination of the cases suggests that there 
was much more unanimity on the question than has been traditionally believed. 
 100 22 US (9 Wheat) 1 (1824). 
 101 Id at 1–2. 
 102 Id at 196–97, 199–200. 
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laws; and various regulations of that class.”103 Webster thought 
that “all these things were, in their general character, rather reg-
ulations of police than of commerce, in the constitutional under-
standing of that term.”104 
Webster recognized that such police regulations could affect 
commerce, but argued that this effect did not make them by na-
ture commercial regulations. “[G]enerally speaking,” he ex-
plained, “roads, and bridges, and ferries, though, of course, they 
affect commerce and intercourse, do not obtain that importance 
and elevation, as to be deemed commercial regulations. . . . Quar-
antine laws, for example, may be considered as affecting com-
merce; yet they are, in their nature, health laws.”105 
How does one reconcile the exercise of these two powers, 
which can sometimes touch on the same subjects? Webster argued 
that it depended on the genuineness of the purpose for which the 
state was regulating: “While a health law is reasonable, it is a 
health law; but if, under colour of it, enactments should be made 
for other purposes, such enactments might be void.”106 
Thomas Oakley, arguing for Ogden, agreed that internal 
state regulations might “indirectly affect the right of commercial 
intercourse between the States,” but so do “quarantine laws, in-
spection laws, duties on auctions, licenses to sell goods, &c,” all of 
which “are acknowledged to be valid.”107 It is the purpose for which 
they are enacted that makes them valid: “They are passed, not 
with a view or design to regulate commerce, but to promote some 
great object of public interest, within the acknowledged scope of 
State legislation: such as the public health, agriculture, revenue, 
or the encouragement of some public improvement.”108 Thus, 
“[b]eing passed for these legitimate objects, they are valid as inter-
nal regulations, though they may incidentally restrict or regulate 
foreign trade, or that between the States.”109 
William Wirt, Attorney General of the United States, replied 
for Gibbons. Importantly, the case was also litigated under the 
Patent Clause, which grants Congress the power “[t]o promote the 
 
 103 Id at 3, 18. 
 104 Gibbons, 22 US (9 Wheat) at 19. 
 105 Id at 20 (emphasis in original).  
 106 Id. 
 107 Id at 71–72. 
 108 Gibbons, 22 US (9 Wheat) at 72. 
 109 Id (emphasis added). Thomas Emmett, also arguing for Ogden, made the less per-
suasive argument that these police powers were also regulations of commerce and thus 
the power over interstate commerce must be concurrent. Id at 112–13. 
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Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times 
to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective 
Writings and Discoveries.”110 New York claimed that its grant of 
a monopoly was like a patent, intended to protect and benefit the 
inventor of a novel and useful method of transportation, the 
steam engine.111 The same arguments about exclusivity were 
made about the Patent Clause. The Attorney General argued: 
It might be admitted, that the State had authority to prohibit 
the use of a patented machine on that ground, or of a book, 
the copy-right of which had been secured, on the ground of its 
impiety or immorality. But the laws which are now in judg-
ment were not passed upon any such ground. The question 
raised by them is, can the States obstruct the operation of an 
act of Congress, by taking the power from the National Leg-
islature into their own hands? Can they prohibit the publica-
tion of an immoral book, licensed by Congress, on the pretext 
of its immorality, and then give an exclusive right to publish 
the same book themselves?112 
Wirt thus implied that if the state regulation were genuinely 
for the purpose of suppressing immorality, within the traditional 
police power, then it could have been valid even if it affected Con-
gress’s power over discoveries and inventions. Although he did 
not make the point explicitly in the context of the commerce 
power, there, too, he argued that “quarantine laws, and other reg-
ulations of police, respecting the public health in the several 
States,” are not truly commercial regulations, suggesting again 
that so long as the intent is not to regulate commerce under pre-
text of such regulation, it would be valid.113 
Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion for the Court makes good 
sense in light of these arguments. After finding that the power 
over commerce includes navigation and that Congress had exer-
cised its power by providing for the licensing of the coasting 
trade,114 he addressed the power of states to regulate on similar 
subjects. Marshall did not deny that inspection laws had a con-
siderable impact on commerce, but their “object” was not com-
merce; their object was “to improve the quality of articles 
 
 110 US Const Art I, § 8, cl 8. 
 111 Gibbons, 22 US (9 Wheat) at 5–6. 
 112 Id at 176 (emphasis added). 
 113 Id at 178. 
 114 Id at 189–97. 
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produced by the labour of a country; to fit them for exportation; 
or, it may be, for domestic use”; such regulations “act upon the 
subject before it becomes an article of foreign commerce, or of com-
merce among the States, and prepare it for that purpose.”115 Quar-
antine laws and “health laws of every description” were similar.116 
Marshall agreed that so long as the state laws were passed 
for those noncommercial purposes, they could not be considered 
impermissible regulations of commerce. “So, if a State, in passing 
laws on subjects acknowledged to be within its control, and with 
a view to those subjects, shall adopt a measure of the same char-
acter with one which Congress may adopt,” Marshall explained, 
“it does not derive its authority from the particular power which 
has been granted [the commerce power], but from some other [the 
police power], which remains with the State, and may be executed 
by the same means.”117 It was the purpose for which the laws were 
enacted that determined the source of the power. Marshall, to be 
sure, never quite answered whether the commerce power was ex-
clusive because even if the state had a concurrent power, Con-
gress’s own law directly conflicted with, and thus preempted, the 
state regulation.118 
Justice William Johnson concurred and argued that the Com-
merce Clause was exclusive. He, too, explained that the distinc-
tion between proper and improper state regulations touching on 
the same subjects of the commerce power was the purpose for 
which those state regulations were enacted:  
It is no objection to the existence of distinct, substantive pow-
ers, that, in their application, they bear upon the same sub-
ject. The same bale of goods, the same cask of provisions, or 
the same ship, that may be the subject of commercial regula-
tion, may also be the vehicle of disease.119 
Thus “the health laws that require them to be stopped and venti-
lated, are no more intended as regulations on commerce, than the 
laws which permit their importation, are intended to innoculate 
the community with disease.”120 It is the purpose and frank exer-
cise of power that marks a valid police regulation: “Their different 
 
 115 Gibbons, 22 US (9 Wheat) at 203. 
 116 Id. 
 117 Id at 204 (emphasis added). 
 118 Id at 209–10 (holding that the exclusive license was in direct conflict with, and 
thus preempted by, Congress’s legislation). 
 119 Gibbons, 22 US (9 Wheat) at 235 (Johnson concurring). 
 120 Id. 
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purposes mark the distinction between the powers brought into 
action; and while frankly exercised, they can produce no serious 
collision.”121  
By 1824, in summary, the Court was monitoring the bounda-
ries of a state’s exercise of its legitimate police powers when that 
power acted on the same subjects as the federal commerce power. 
The states were not generally limited to reasonable police regula-
tions, but they were specifically limited to such reasonable regu-
lations if those regulations also affected interstate commerce. 
Considering the reasonableness of the regulation, and the genu-
ineness of the state’s purpose, was how the Court ensured that 
the states were not improperly trying to regulate interstate com-
merce—a power that the Court at least assumed might belong ex-
clusively to Congress. 
2. Willson v Black Bird Creek Marsh Co (1829). 
Willson v Black Bird Creek Marsh Co,122 decided only five 
years after Gibbons, also suggested that the federal commerce 
power was exclusive but that the states could make reasonable 
police regulations that happened to affect interstate commerce.123 
In Willson, the state of Delaware had authorized the construction 
of a dam in a navigable stream. The owners of a sloop licensed 
under the federal navigation laws damaged the dam in order to 
pass it. When the corporation that had constructed the dam sued 
for damages, the owners of the sloop defended on the grounds that 
the dam had been unlawfully constructed because Delaware’s law 
was an unconstitutional regulation of interstate commerce.124 
US Attorney General Wirt defended the state law, arguing 
that the dam was constructed upon “one of those sluggish reptile 
streams, that do not run but creep, and which, wherever it passes, 
spreads its venom, and destroys the health of all those who in-
habit its marshes.”125 He therefore rejected the assertion “that a 
law authorising the erection of a dam, and the formation of banks 
which will draw off the pestilence, and give to those who have 
before suffered from disease, health and vigour, is unconstitu-
tional.”126 Chief Justice Marshall agreed that “[t]he value of the 
 
 121 Id (emphasis added). 
 122 27 US (2 Pet) 245 (1829). 
 123 Id at 251–52. 
 124 Id at 245–46. 
 125 Id at 249. 
 126 Willson, 27 US (2 Pet) at 249. 
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property on its banks must be enhanced by excluding the water 
from the marsh, and the health of the inhabitants probably im-
proved.”127 Focusing on the legitimate purpose for which the state 
had exercised its police powers, Marshall upheld the statute: 
“Measures calculated to produce these objects, provided they do 
not come into collision with the powers of the general government, 
are undoubtedly within those which are reserved to the states.”128 
Marshall thus again implied that measures calculated to inter-
fere with commerce as opposed to those calculated to advance a 
genuine police-power purpose might be invalid. 
The difference between Willson and Gibbons was that in  
Willson there was no federal statute involved at all. Marshall 
thus observed that the authorization to construct the dam could 
not “be considered as repugnant to the power to regulate com-
merce in its dormant state.”129 This holding—and Justice  
Johnson’s agreement with the opinion, as he did not write sepa-
rately—suggests further movement in the direction of federal ex-
clusivity over commerce. But so long as the state’s action was for 
a genuine police-power purpose, and so long as it was genuinely 
“calculated to produce” the legitimate ends of the police power, it 
was valid. Thus, it might be said that by 1829 state regulations 
affecting interstate commerce, irrespective of whether Congress 
had also regulated on the subject, were required to be genuinely 
for police-power purposes. Federal law overrode such proper state 
laws only in the event of a direct conflict, such as was found in 
Gibbons.130 
 
 127 Id at 251. 
 128 Id (emphasis added). 
 129 Id at 252 (emphasis added). 
 130 In Justice Joseph Story’s 1833 Commentaries, he summarized the general consen-
sus on the Commerce Clause. The power is “exclusive” because what Congress chooses not 
to regulate is as much part of its system as that which it chooses to regulate: “Regulation 
is designed to indicate the entire result, applying to those parts, which remain as they 
were, as well as to those, which are altered”; the power to regulate “produces a uniform 
whole, which is as much disturbed and deranged by changing, what the regulating power 
designs to have unbounded, as that, on which it has operated.” Joseph Story, 2 Commen-
taries on the Constitution of the United States 513 (Hilliard, Gray 1833). As for the states’ 
powers over “certain subjects, having a connexion with commerce,” such powers “are entirely 
distinct in their nature from that to regulate commerce.” Id at 514–15. Health, inspection, 
and pilotage laws “are not so much regulations of commerce, as of police.” Id at 515. 
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3. Other cases through 1867. 
At issue in the 1837 case of Mayor, Aldermen, and Common-
alty of the City of New York v Miln131 was a state law requiring 
ship captains to provide lists of their passengers, with the osten-
sible purpose of helping the state keep immigrants from becoming 
public charges.132 The majority opinion—only Justice Joseph 
Story dissented and Justice Smith Thompson concurred—held 
that whether or not the commerce power was exclusive, the state’s 
law was a legitimate exercise of the police power.133 
Critically, the Court examined the purpose of the statute and 
the ends sought to attain that purpose. “To decide” whether the 
regulation was “not of commerce, but police,” Justice Philip  
Barbour wrote, “let us examine its purpose, the end to be at-
tained, and the means of its attainment.”134 The Court thought it 
“apparent” that the “object” of the legislature was “to prevent New 
York from being burdened by an influx of persons brought thither 
in ships, either from foreign countries, or from any other of the 
states,” and “to prevent them from becoming chargeable as pau-
pers.”135 The Court held “that both the end and the means here 
used, are within the competency of the states,”136 that the purpose 
of the legislature was in fact to secure the protection of those re-
siding in New York and to provide for their welfare, and that the 
means were appropriate for those ends.137 
The Court then summed up the existing state of the doctrine: 
From this it appears, that whilst a state is acting within the 
legitimate scope of its power as to the end to be attained, it 
may use whatsoever means, being appropriate to that end, it 
may think fit; although they may be the same, or so nearly 
the same, as scarcely to be distinguishable from those 
adopted by congress acting under a different power: subject, 
 
 131 36 US (11 Pet) 102 (1837). 
 132 Id at 130–31, 133. 
 133 Id at 132:  
We shall not enter into any examination of the question whether the power to 
regulate commerce, be or be not exclusive of the states, because the opinion 
which we have formed renders it unnecessary: in other words, we are of opinion 
that the act is not a regulation of commerce, but of police; and that being thus 
considered, it was passed in the exercise of a power which rightfully belonged to 
the states. 
 134 Id at 132–33. 
 135 Miln, 36 US (11 Pet) at 133. 
 136 Id. 
 137 Id at 133–34. 
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only, say the Court, to this limitation, that in the event of col-
lision, the law of the state must yield to the law of congress.138 
In sum, whether or not the commerce power was exclusive, the 
states had a different source of power—the police power—that 
could act on the same subjects as Congress’s power over com-
merce. Such acts “within the legitimate scope of [state] power” 
were valid unless in direct conflict with a congressional regula-
tion of commerce. 
The debate over the exclusivity of the commerce power flared 
up again in the License Cases139 and the Passenger Cases140 in the 
late 1840s. The former involved the power of states to prohibit 
entirely the sale of liquor within their borders notwithstanding a 
congressional law authorizing their importation from abroad.141 
The power of the states was affirmed, but there was a series of 
different opinions. Although Chief Justice Roger Taney seemed to 
believe that states had plenary power to regulate commerce until 
Congress acted, at least four of the justices argued that state laws 
for the protection of health or morals were valid exercises of police 
powers rather than regulations of commerce.142 
The Passenger Cases involved state laws charging ship cap-
tains a fee per passenger, and these laws were struck down by a 
vote of 5–4.143 The three-justice plurality argued that the com-
merce power was exclusive, but that states could make police reg-
ulations affecting commerce. Even though “[a] State cannot regu-
late foreign commerce,” Justice John McLean explained, “it may 
do many things which more or less affect it.”144 Whether a regula-
tion was a police or commercial one depended on its objective. In 
this case, the law in question was “called a health law,” but to so 
call it “would seem to be a misapplication of the term.”145 Indeed, 
some of the funds went to a juvenile reform society.146 Justice 
McLean thus inquired into the “objects and means” of the law and 
 
 138 Id at 137. 
 139 46 US (5 How) 504 (1847). 
 140 48 US (7 How) 283 (1849). 
 141 License Cases, 46 US (5 How) at 574 (Taney). 
 142 See id at 581 (Taney); id at 595 (McLean); id at 630 (Woodbury); id at 631–32 
(Grier). For a brief summary of the various opinions, see Currie, The Constitution in the 
Supreme Court at 225–26 (cited in note 99). 
 143 Passenger Cases, 48 US (7 How) at 392–93, 409. 
 144 Id at 402.  
 145 Id at 403. 
 146 Id. 
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found them wanting.147 He concluded: “The police power of the 
State cannot draw within its jurisdiction objects which lie beyond 
it. It meets the commercial power of the Union in dealing with 
subjects under the protection of that power, yet it can only be ex-
erted under peculiar emergencies and to a limited extent.”148 “In 
guarding the safety, the health, and morals of its citizens, a State 
is restricted to appropriate and constitutional means.”149 
The legitimate scope of the police power continued to play a 
role up through the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment.  
Although the doctrine was in a state of evolution, as late as 1867 
in Steamship Co v Portwardens,150 the Court unanimously recog-
nized that “some [state] powers, the exercise of which may, in var-
ious degrees, affect commerce, have always been held not to be 
within the grant to Congress,” and “[t]o this class it is settled be-
long quarantine and other health laws, laws concerning the do-
mestic police, and laws regulating the internal trade of a State.”151 
The Court concluded in that case that a direct tax imposed by 
Louisiana upon every entering ship could not be sustained on any 
of these grounds and was therefore an invalid direct regulation of 
commerce.152 
C. Obligations of Contract 
In the antebellum period there was another prominent legal 
doctrine requiring courts occasionally to inquire into the legiti-
mate police-power purposes of legislative acts. This doctrine pre-
vented states from impairing the obligations of existing contracts, 
stemming from the federal Constitution’s Contracts Clause153 or 
similar prohibitions in state constitutions. The context of these 
disputes usually arose when a state granted a private corporation 
a charter and subsequently sought to make regulations that 
might affect the private corporation’s existing rights under the 
charter. The doctrine maintained that so long as an exercise of 
state power was genuinely for a police-power purpose, the state 
 
 147 Passenger Cases, 48 US (7 How) at 404. 
 148 Id at 408. 
 149 Id. 
 150 73 US (6 Wall) 31 (1867). 
 151 Id at 33. 
 152 Id at 33–34. 
 153 US Const Art I, § 10, cl 1 (“No State shall . . . pass any . . . Law impairing the Ob-
ligation of Contracts.”). 
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could modify the rights and privileges of a corporation notwith-
standing any existing charter. 
Such was the prominent case of Thorpe v Rutland & Burlington 
Railroad Co,154 decided by Vermont’s highest court. The case “in-
volve[d] the question of the right of the legislature to require ex-
isting railways to respond in damages for all cattle killed or in-
jured by their trains until they erect suitable cattle-guards at 
farm-crossings.”155 There would have been no serious doubt as to 
the state’s power to enact such a law if the requirement had al-
ready existed in the corporation’s charter or by virtue of the “gen-
eral laws of the state at the date of the charter.”156 
The court analyzed the case under a police-powers frame-
work. “We think the power of the legislature to control existing 
railways in this respect, may be found in the general control over 
the police of the country, which resides in the law-making power 
in all free states.”157 “This police power of the state extends to the 
protection of the lives, limbs, health, comfort, and quiet of all per-
sons, and the protection of all property within the state.”158 It is 
“within the range of legislative action to define the mode and 
manner in which every one may so use his own as not to injure 
others” according “to the maxim, Sic utere tuo ut alienum non 
laedas.”159 Thus, the court concluded that “the authority of the 
legislature to make the requirement of existing railways may be 
vindicated, because it comes fairly within the police of the 
state.”160 Other courts took a similar approach to the issue,161 as 
 
 154 27 Vt 140 (1855). 
 155 Id at 142. 
 156 Id. 
 157 Id at 149. 
 158 Thorpe, 27 Vt at 149. 
 159 Id. 
 160 Id at 156. 
 161 See, for example, Galena & Chicago Union Railroad Co v Loomis, 13 Ill 548,  
550 (1852):  
That the legislature has the power, by the enactment of general laws, from time 
to time, as the public exigencies may require, to regulate corporations in the 
exercise of their franchises, so as to provide for the public safety, admits of no 
doubt. The provision in question is a mere police regulation, enacted for the pro-
tection and safety of the citizens of the country, and in no manner interferes with 
or impairs the powers conferred on the defendants in their act of incorporation. 
See also, for example, Inhabitants of Veazie v Mayo, 45 Me 560, 564 (1858) (“[I]ndependent 
of and aside from all charter provisions, it is only the exercise of that police power which 
is always necessarily retained by the people in their sovereign capacity, for the security of 
the public safety, and of which they cannot be divested by legislative enactment or char-
tered immunities.”). 
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did the US Supreme Court in Charles River Bridge v Warren 
Bridge.162 
Then-attorney Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr provided a succinct 
summary of these contract and commerce doctrines in a footnote 
to the 1873 edition of Chancellor James Kent’s Commentaries, 
which he edited.163 After Kent’s discussion of the power of states 
to regulate nuisances, slaughterhouses, and the like, Holmes pro-
vides the following comment:  
This power of the government is now called the police power 
. . . . But acts which can only be justified on the ground that 
they are police regulations, must be so clearly necessary to 
the safety, comfort, or well-being of society, or so imperatively 
required by the public necessity, that they must be taken to 
be impliedly excepted from the words of the constitutional 
prohibition.164 
Holmes then described the contract and commerce cases.165 
Thus, Holmes, who dissented in Lochner,166 agreed that legis-
lative acts requiring a police-power justification “must be so 
clearly necessary” to those powers.167 But this requirement only 
existed when those acts otherwise might run into conflict with 
constitutional prohibitions, namely the Contracts Clause or Com-
merce Clause. The states were not limited to reasonable exercises 
of the police powers when their exercise of power did not come 
into potential collision with federal constitutional rights. 
 
 162 36 US (11 Pet) 420 (1837). In that case, the Court held that Massachusetts could 
authorize the construction of the Warren Bridge between Boston and Charlestown, even 
though it had previously granted a charter to the Charles River Bridge Company to con-
struct a bridge between the two towns. See id at 536–38, 548–53. The Court held there 
was no impairment of contractual obligations, even though the new bridge would signifi-
cantly diminish the value of the previous charter, because “by legal intendments and mere 
technical reasoning,” the corporation cannot take away from the state “any portion of that 
power over their own internal police and improvement, which is so necessary to their well 
being and prosperity.” Id at 552. 
 163 James Kent, 2 Commentaries on American Law 441 n 2 (Little, Brown 12th ed 
1873) (Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr, ed). 
 164 Id, citing Cooley, Treatise on Constitutional Limitations at 572–97 (cited in note 3) 
and Thorpe, 27 Vt 140. 
 165 Kent, 2 Commentaries on American Law at 441 n 2 (cited in note 164).  
 166 Lochner, 198 US at 74 (Holmes dissenting). 
 167 Kent, 2 Commentaries on American Law at 441 n 2 (cited in note 164). 
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D. Vested Rights and Pro- and Antislavery Constitutionalism 
There are two cases that are often believed to be exceptions 
to the claim of the preceding sections, in which antebellum courts 
appear to have adopted a substantive version of due process of 
law. In Wynehamer, the New York Court of Appeals invalidated a 
state prohibition on liquor as applied to liquor that existed before 
the statute’s enactment.168 Professor James Ely described this 
case as “the first time that a court determined that the concept of 
due process prevented the legislature from regulating the benefi-
cial enjoyment of property in such a manner as to destroy its 
value.”169 The other case is infamous for advancing a vision of sub-
stantive due process at the federal level: Dred Scott, in which the 
Court held that Congress could not, without violating due process 
of law, prohibit slave owners from carrying their slave property 
into the federal territories.170 
Several points distinguish these two cases from the other 
cases on which scholars have relied for antebellum support for 
economic substantive due process. First, even if these two cases 
were valid exceptions, they would only apply in an incredibly 
small subset of cases involving the total prohibition on possessing 
a species of property that had been obtained lawfully under pre-
viously existing laws. Most of the police-power cases involving 
regulations on butchering, selling in the market, and freedom of 
contract simply do not invoke this issue. 
Second, these two cases seem to have misunderstood the 
“vested rights” doctrine on which they were based. This doctrine 
prohibited legislatures from taking away a particular person’s 
 
 168 Wynehamer, 13 NY at 392–93, 395–96, 405–06. But even here the court was at least 
arguably trying to apply the standard vested rights doctrine. See, for example, id at 393: 
The true interpretation of these constitutional phrases is, that where rights are 
acquired by the citizen under the existing law, there is no power in any branch 
of the government to take them away; but where they are held contrary to the 
existing law, or are forfeited by its violation, then they may be taken from him—
not by an act of the legislature, but in the due administration of the law itself, 
before the judicial tribunals of the state. The cause or occasion for depriving the 
citizen of his supposed rights must be found in the law as it is, or, at least it 
cannot be created by a legislative act which aims at their destruction. 
 169 Ely, Guardian of Every Other Right at 80 (cited in note 19). 
 170 Dred Scott, 60 US (19 How) at 450: 
[A]n act of Congress which deprives a citizen of the United States of his liberty 
or property, merely because he came himself or brought his property into a par-
ticular Territory of the United States, and who had committed no offence against 
the laws, could hardly be dignified with the name of due process of law. 
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property that had already “vested.” As Professors Chapman and 
McConnell explain, that is perfectly consistent with the proce-
dural understanding of due process: a legislature cannot take 
property that has vested in A and give it to B. Property rights can 
only be arranged prospectively by general, standing laws.171 To be 
sure, sometimes the vested rights doctrine was invoked to over-
turn even apparently prospective legislation. Perhaps the most 
famous example is Hoke v Henderson.172 North Carolina had pre-
viously had a statute granting court clerks tenure during “good 
behaviour,” and the petitioner had held his office pursuant to that 
statute.173 At issue in Hoke was a new statute requiring elections 
for court clerks. The North Carolina Supreme Court held the stat-
ute unconstitutional, observing that it could “operate prospec-
tively” as a regulation “for future appointments and future enjoy-
ment”; but “[a]s to those to whom the grant was made for life, an 
estate, a property vested; which cannot be divested without de-
fault or crime.”174 Therefore, even in Hoke, although the court may 
have gotten the lower-order result wrong, it at least believed that 
it was simply applying the traditional vested rights doctrine. 
Wynehamer and Dred Scott were the first cases to hold that 
there were some types of property that could not be prohibited by 
legislation at all. These courts simply got the vested rights doc-
trine wrong. As Justice Cooley explained in his treatise, many liq-
uor prohibitions had been sustained by state courts. As a result 
of this legislation, “the merchant of yesterday becomes the crimi-
nal of to-day, and the very building in which he lives and conducts 
the business which to that moment was lawful becomes perhaps 
a nuisance, if the statute shall so declare, and liable to be pro-
ceeded against for a forfeiture.”175 Legislatures were allowed to 
prohibit certain species of property, though perhaps there had to 
be a legitimate police-power purpose for doing so.176 
 
 171 See, for example, Chapman and McConnell, 121 Yale L J at 1712 (cited in note 1) 
(“The contours of this argument suggest that ‘general law’ interpretations of state law-of-
the-land and due process clauses are not as different in basic rationale from the ‘proce-
dural’ or ‘vested rights’ interpretations as some commentators have suggested.”); id at 
1726 (arguing that “courts applied due process to . . . [legislative] acts that operated to 
deprive specific persons of liberty or vested property rights”). 
 172 15 NC (4 Dev) 1 (1833). 
 173 Id at 11. 
 174 Id at 21. 
 175 Cooley, Treatise on Constitutional Limitations at 584 (cited in note 3). 
 176 As Cooley wrote, vested rights were those “which it is equitable the government 
should recognize, and of which the individual cannot be deprived without injustice.” Id at 
358. See also John Harrison, Legislative Power and Judicial Power, 31 Const Commen 
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Third, these two cases were widely condemned at the time. 
Professor John Hart Ely argued that “Wynehamer and the Dred 
Scott reference were aberrations, neither precedented nor des-
tined to become precedents themselves,” and that “[o]ther courts 
on which they were urged were quite acid in the judgment that 
they had misused the constitutional language by giving it a sub-
stantive reading.”177 
To be sure, some scholars have argued that these cases re-
flected a changed public understanding of due process as a result 
of antislavery ideology.178 This began when the proponents of slav-
ery argued that depriving masters of their slave property by law 
would be to deprive them of property without due process of law.179 
They made this argument in support of their agenda to deny Con-
gress any power to prohibit slavery in the territories or the Dis-
trict of Columbia, notwithstanding Congress’s clear power to 
make all “needful”180 regulations for the territories and to exercise 
“exclusive”181 legislation over the District.  
The antislavery advocates struck back. If anything, slavery 
itself violates due process because it deprives the slave of liberty 
and their property in their own labor, with no process at all. Pro-
fessor Barnett has catalogued many antislavery constitutional-
ists making such arguments.182 For example, Theodore Dwight 
Weld argued in 1838, “All the slaves in the District have been 
‘deprived of liberty’ by legislative acts. Now, these legislative acts 
 
295, 297 (2016) (arguing that under the nineteenth-century doctrine of vested rights, 
“courts held that some legal interests were immune from change by legislation enacted 
after the interest was created,” but this doctrine “protected only some legal interests, in-
terests that were identified on grounds of justice and the public good”). 
 177 John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review 16  
(Harvard 1980). 
 178 See, for example, Jacobus tenBroek, Equal Under Law 50–51, 121–22 (Collier 
1965). See also Howard Jay Graham, The Early Antislavery Backgrounds of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, in Everyman’s Constitution: Historical Essays on the Fourteenth Amendment, 
the “Conspiracy Theory”, and American Constitutionalism 152–241 (Heffernan 1968). Pro-
fessor Robert Cover, on the other hand, has argued that the scholars who have claimed 
the Fourteenth Amendment was an affirmation of antislavery constitutional thought rely 
on a minority of antislavery thinkers whose constitutional views were not widely shared. 
Robert M. Cover, Justice Accused: Antislavery and the Judicial Process 154–55 (Yale 1975). 
 179 See tenBroek, Equal Under Law at 42 (cited in note 178). 
 180 US Const Art IV, § 3, cl 2. 
 181 US Const Art I, § 8, cl 17.  
 182 Randy E. Barnett, Whence Comes Section One? The Abolitionist Origins of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, 3 J Legal Analysis 165, 174–246 (2011). 
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‘depriving’ them ‘of liberty,’ were either ‘due process of law,’ or 
they were not.”183 Alvan Stewart wrote in 1837:  
[T]he true and only meaning of the phrase, “due process of 
law,” is an indictment or presentment by a grand jury, of not 
less than twelve, nor more than twenty-three men; a trial by 
a petit jury of twelve men, and a judgment pronounced on the 
finding of the jury, by a court; 
and, of course, “there is not a slave at this moment, in the United 
States” who had become a slave according to these procedures.184 
William Goodell similarly argued that any person “deprived 
of liberty without indictment, jury trial, and judgment of Court, 
is therefore UNCONSTITUTIONALLY deprived of liberty.”185 In the 
context of the fugitive slave laws, Salmon P. Chase argued, “Now, 
unless it can be shewn that no process of law at all, is the same 
thing as due process of law, it must be admitted that the act which 
authorizes seizure without process, is repugnant to a constitution 
which expressly forbids it.”186 The Republican Party platform of 
1860 summed this all up: because the Founding Fathers “or-
dained that ‘no persons should be deprived of life, liberty or prop-
erty without due process of law,’ . . . we deny the authority of  
Congress, of a territorial legislature, or of any individuals, to give 
legal existence to slavery in any territory of the United States.”187 
These abolitionist arguments about the meaning of due pro-
cess do not seem to support substantive due process at all. Every 
single statement from these famous abolitionists relies entirely 
on the procedural understanding of due process. Indeed, slaves 
became slaves by no order of any court. More still, they violated 
no preexisting law. They became slaves simply because the law 
directed that the mere existence of these individuals was suffi-
cient to render them subject to the forced violence of slavery. But 
 
 183 Theodore Dwight Weld, The Power of Congress over the District of Columbia 40 
(Trow 1838). 
 184 Alvan Stewart, A Constitutional Argument, on the Subject of Slavery (originally 
published 1837), in Howard L. Lubert, Kevin R. Hardwick, and Scott J. Hammond, eds, 
The American Debate over Slavery, 1760–1865: An Anthology of Sources 159, 160–61 
(Hackett 2016). 
 185 William Goodell, Views of American Constitutional Law, in Its Bearing upon Amer-
ican Slavery 61 (Lawson & Chaplin 2d ed 1845). 
 186 Salmon P. Chase, An Argument for the Defendant, Submitted to the Supreme Court 
of the United States, at the December Term, 1846, in the Case of Wharton Jones v John 
Vanzandt 89 (R.P. Donogh 1847). 
 187 Republican Party Platform of 1860, Declaration 8 (American Presidency Project, 
2019), archived at https://perma.cc/24PM-KYH6. 
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surely the requirement of a general law means that someone 
must have it within his power not to violate that law at all and 
thus to avoid the punishment. Otherwise the requirement for 
preexisting, established law is a mockery. Put another way, a law 
that punishes for an immutable characteristic is not “law” within 
the procedural meaning of due process of law. 
In sum, in the antebellum period, it would appear that state 
legislatures were not generally limited to reasonable exercises of 
the police power. They were only so limited when their exercise of 
power came into potential conflict with express constitutional 
prohibitions, most prominently against regulating interstate 
commerce or impairing the obligations of contract. At most, two 
cases were widely understood to adopt a version of substantive 
due process. Yet these two cases applied to a narrow set of cir-
cumstances (the total abolition of certain types of property), 
rested on a misunderstanding of the vested rights doctrine, and 
were generally disapproved. Further, the arguments rooted in an-
tislavery constitutionalism were consistent with the procedural 
understanding of due process even if they were thought to be rad-
ical at the time. 
II.  REHABILITATING COOLEY 
The preceding Part examined three prominent legal doctrines 
involving police powers in the antebellum period. First, state 
courts could invalidate municipal laws if they were unreasonable, 
in restraint of trade, not for genuine police-power purposes, or be-
yond the powers delegated to them by the state.188 Second, federal 
courts could invalidate state laws affecting interstate commerce 
if they were not genuinely for police-power purposes.189 Third, 
courts could inquire into the purposes of state legislation affecting 
existing contracts.190 Yet no court seems to have invalidated state 
legislative acts for being unreasonable, in restraint of trade, or in 
excess of legitimate police powers when they involved only inter-
nal matters or internal commerce and affected no existing con-
tractual obligations.191 Indeed, the few cases we have seen on 
point suggested that state courts would not have invalidated such 
 
 188 See Part I.A. 
 189 See Part I.B. 
 190 See Part I.C. 
 191 See Part I.D. 
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state legislation even if they believed them to be unreasonable or 
improper exercises of the police power.192 
This Part examines Justice Cooley’s renowned 1868 Treatise 
on the Constitutional Limitations Which Rest upon the Legislative 
Power of the States of the American Union. Examining Cooley’s 
treatise is useful because it was the most wide-ranging and influ-
ential treatise on American law in the year of the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s adoption.193 It is thus good evidence of what doc-
trines of American law may have informed the language of that 
amendment. 
Additionally, many proponents of substantive due process of 
the police-power variety rely on Cooley’s treatise as evidence that 
the concept existed in American law prior to the adoption of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.194 For example, Professor James Ely de-
scribes Cooley as “the most influential constitutional writer of the 
late nineteenth century,” and argues he “embraced a substantive 
understanding of due process in his landmark work,” namely that 
due process “was intended to safeguard individuals from the ar-
bitrary exercise of governmental power.”195 Professor Williams de-
scribes Cooley similarly as “[b]y far the most influential of the 
early post–Civil War commentators to address the meaning of due 
process and law-of-the-land provisions.”196 He contends that  
“Cooley’s focus on the legitimacy of the legislature’s objectives and 
the means pursued to attain those objectives corresponds closely 
with the police powers version of due process that predominated 
during the Lochner era,” and that “Cooley is frequently credited 
as one of the principal intellectual forerunners of Lochner-era 
substantive due process jurisprudence.”197 Professor Mayer cites 
Cooley for the proposition that “state courts in the nineteenth cen-
tury understood the general regulatory power of the states known 
as the ‘police power’ to be broad but certainly not unlimited.”198 
 
 192 See Part I.A.2. 
 193 See note 32. Additionally, Professor Alan Jones has explained that the treatise 
“went through six editions, and had a broader circulation, greater sale, and was more fre-
quently cited than any other book on American law published in the last half of the nine-
teenth century.” Alan Jones, Thomas M. Cooley and “Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism”: A 
Reconsideration, 53 J Am Hist 751, 759 (1967). 
 194 For a fuller citation to such scholars than what is provided below, see note 32. 
 195 Ely, 16 Const Commen at 342 (cited in note 3). 
 196 Williams, 120 Yale L J at 493 (cited in note 2). 
 197 Id at 494. 
 198 Mayer, 36 Hastings Const L Q at 233 & n 71 (cited in note 3). 
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Even Professor David Currie, who was by no means sympa-
thetic to this version of substantive due process, claimed that  
Cooley “further propagated” in his “influential treatise in 1868” 
the proposition that the Due Process Clause could be used to 
“strike down federal statutes on the ground that they were sub-
stantively objectionable.”199 “If it were necessary to name the prin-
cipal contributor to the cause of constitutional laissez faire in the 
era following the Civil War,” wrote Professor Clyde Jacobs, 
“Thomas M. Cooley would deserve such designation.”200 Perhaps 
the most sustained commentary of this sort comes from Professor 
Harry Scheiber’s entry on state police power in The Encyclopedia 
of the American Constitution: 
Of basic importance to Cooley’s view of the limitations that 
ought to confine the power of state legislatures was his prem-
ise that the “due bounds of legislative power” were not set 
alone by “express constitutional provisions.” The implied lim-
itations that he believed ought to apply all hinged on a gen-
eralized “due process” concept. Due process, he contended, 
forbade enactment of what he termed “class legislation” (laws 
imposing burdens or granting privileges to specific groups or 
interests that were arbitrarily singled out instead of being 
“reasonably” classified). Moreover, his generous definition of 
due process would forbid laws that were “arbitrary and unu-
sual [in] nature,” and as such “unknown to the law of the 
land.”201 
Cooley has been misunderstood. It is the burden of this Part 
to rehabilitate him.202 Although isolated sentences from Cooley’s 
 
 199 Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court at 365 & n 11 (cited in note 99). 
 200 Jacobs, Law Writers and the Courts at 27 (cited in note 17). 
 201 Harry N. Scheiber, State Police Power, in Leonard W. Levy and Kenneth L. Karst, 
eds, 5 Encyclopedia of the American Constitution 2505, 2508 (Macmillan 2d ed 2000) (al-
teration in original). 
 202 As far as I have been able to discover, the last serious attempt at reinterpreting 
Cooley along less laissez-faire lines was Jones’s 1967 article. See Jones, 53 J Am Hist at 
751 (cited in note 193). He observed that Cooley “showed considerable respect for legisla-
tive discretion,” and that he may have anticipated Professor James Bradley Thayer as a 
leading nineteenth-century defender of judicial restraint. Id at 762–63. Even Jones, how-
ever, argued that Cooley did propound a kind of substantive due process. Id at 761: 
Cooley was settling the general rule that any action so arbitrary in its effect 
upon individuals as to stand apart from the established usages of Anglo- 
American law could not be dignified as “due process of law” or as the “law of the 
land” in any government claiming to be constitutional. . . . By making this sub-
stantive meaning of due process Cooley provided an authoritative definition by 
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treatise might seem to support a police-power version of substan-
tive due process, his treatise tracks the legal doctrines described 
in Part I. More still, Cooley elsewhere in his treatise expressly 
disavows the power of courts to strike down legislation for sub-
stantive unreasonableness absent some explicit constitutional 
provision. At most, Cooley suggests that antebellum courts used 
a version of substantive due process as a rule of statutory con-
struction, much like the Illinois court did in Rumpff.203 
A. The Police Powers 
1. Municipal governments. 
Cooley’s treatise contains an entire chapter on the limitations 
on municipal governments.204 The powers of such governments 
are to be strictly construed according to the delegations of power 
from the states.205 And municipal bylaws must be reasonable; 
“[w]henever they appear not to be so, the court must, as a matter 
of law, declare them void.”206 Critically, to be reasonable they 
must genuinely tend toward the accomplishment of the purposes 
for which the municipal corporation exists: “To render them rea-
sonable, they should tend in some degree to the accomplishment 
of the objects for which the corporation was created and its powers 
conferred.”207 Thus, if a bylaw 
assumes to be a police regulation, but deprives a party of the 
use of his property without regard to the public good, under 
the pretence of the preservation of health, when it is manifest 
that such is not the object and purpose of the regulation, it 
will be set aside as a clear and direct infringement of the 
right of property without any compensating advantages.208 
 
which judges could find a written constitutional limitation to various types of 
legislative action.  
See also id at 760 (similar). 
 203 See notes 87–96 and accompanying text. 
 204 Cooley, Treatise on Constitutional Limitations at 189–255 (cited in note 3). 
 205 See id at 195 (“And the general disposition of the courts in this country has been 
to confine municipalities within the limits that a strict construction of the grants of powers 
in their charters will assign to them; thus applying substantially the same rule that is 
applied to charters of private incorporation.”). 
 206 Id at 200. 
 207 Id at 200–01. 
 208 Cooley, Treatise on Constitutional Limitations at 203 (cited in note 3).  
856 The University of Chicago Law Review [87:815 
 
Under these principles, municipalities have the power to pro-
hibit the carrying on of dangerous occupations, but if they permit 
such activities they must be equally available to all who desire to 
participate in them.209 Their bylaws cannot be in restraint of 
trade.210 When they have authority to order the cleansing or 
abatement of slaughterhouses, they cannot entirely prohibit 
slaughterhouses from particular sections of the town.211 
2. State governments. 
Much later in his work, Cooley provides a chapter on the “po-
lice powers of the states” themselves.212 It is here we encounter 
the other two prevailing antebellum doctrines. Cooley’s chapter 
deals with two questions: the first arising from the “conflict be-
tween national and State authority,” and the second involving 
“whether the State exceeds its just powers in dealing with the 
property and restraining the actions of individuals.”213 
Cooley defines the police power of a state as “its system of 
internal regulation, by which it is sought not only to preserve the 
public order and to prevent offences against the State, but also”—
and here is the key passage— 
to establish for the intercourse of citizen with citizen those 
rules of good manners and good neighborhood which are cal-
culated to prevent a conflict of rights, and to insure to each 
the uninterrupted enjoyment of his own, so far as is reasona-
bly consistent with a like enjoyment of rights by others.214 
This is a statement of general principle. State power exists only 
for the benefit, and not the oppression, of the subjects. But Cooley 
 
 209 Id at 201: 
And if a corporation has power to prohibit the carrying on of dangerous occupa-
tions within its limits, a by-law which should permit one person to carry on such 
an occupation and prohibit another, who had an equal right, from pursuing the 
same business, or which should allow the business to be carried on in existing 
buildings, but prohibit the erection of others for it, would be unreasonable. 
 210 Id at 202: 
So a by-law to be reasonable should be in harmony with the common law. If it is 
in general restraint of trade,—as a by-law that no person shall exercise the art 
of painter in the city of London, not being free of the company of painters,—it 
will be void on this ground. 
 211 Id at 204 n 2. 
 212 Cooley, Treatise on Constitutional Limitations at 572–97 (cited in note 3).  
 213 Id at 572. 
 214 Id. 
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here says nothing about a court’s power to enforce these princi-
ples of free government as the court happens to see them. Indeed, 
the only authority Cooley quotes that bears on that question sug-
gests the opposite: 
The power we allude to is rather the police power; the power 
vested in the legislature by the constitution to make, ordain, 
and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, 
statutes, and ordinances, either with penalties or without, 
not repugnant to the constitution, as they shall judge to be 
for the good and welfare of the Commonwealth, and of the 
subjects of the same.215 
Here there is little to suggest a judicial authority to enforce the 
reasonableness of a state’s exercise of its police powers. 
Cooley next discusses the relationship of the police powers to 
the commerce power. “One of the most important questions re-
specting this power, in a constitutional point of view, concerns 
those cases over which jurisdiction is vested in the national gov-
ernment, whereby, it is sometimes claimed, that the police juris-
diction of the State is necessarily excluded.”216 Here Cooley encap-
sulates the doctrine described in Part I: “It is plain, however, from 
a statement of the theory upon which the police power rests, that 
any proper exercise of it by the State cannot come in conflict with 
the provisions of the Constitution of the United States.”217 Cooley 
subsequently refers to the License Cases and explains that the 
complete prohibition on liquor has sometimes been argued to 
“conflict with the Federal Constitution” (that is, the commerce 
power), but that such regulations “are but the ordinary police reg-
ulations, such as the State may make in respect to all classes of 
trade or employment.”218 Most of Cooley’s chapter is devoted to the 
relationship of the police powers to the commerce power.219 
In between two separate discussions of the commerce power, 
Cooley mentions the relationship of the police powers to the obli-
gations of contract. “[I]t has been invariably held that [the Con-
tracts Clause] does not so far remove from State control the rights 
and properties which depend for their existence or enforcement 
 
 215 Id at 573 (emphasis added), quoting Commonwealth v Alger, 61 Mass (7 Cush) 53, 
84–85 (1851). 
 216 Cooley, Treatise on Constitutional Limitations at 574 (cited in note 3). 
 217 Id (emphasis added). 
 218 Id at 581. 
 219 See id at 584–94. 
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upon contracts,” Cooley explains, “as to relieve them from the op-
eration of such general regulations for the good government of the 
State and the protection of the rights of individuals as may be 
deemed important.”220 Thus, the rights conferred on private cor-
porations “are subject to such new regulations as from time to 
time may be made by the State with a view to the public protec-
tion, health, and safety, and to properly guard the rights of other 
individuals and corporations.”221 
“The limit to the exercise of the police power in these [con-
tract] cases must be this,” Cooley summarizes: “[T]he regulations 
must have reference to the comfort, safety, or welfare of society” 
and “must not, under pretence of regulation, take from the corpo-
ration any of the essential rights and privileges which the charter 
confers.”222 “In short,” Cooley adds, “they must be police regula-
tions in fact, and not amendments of the charter in curtailment 
of the corporate franchise.”223 
In a particularly important passage, already mentioned 
above, Cooley discusses police regulations like those involved in 
the License Cases and Wynehamer that entirely destroy the value 
of property or employment. Cooley explains the harm such regu-
lations can do to individuals. The sale of liquor being lawful, and 
the “capital employed in it being fully protected by law, the legis-
lature then steps in, and, by an enactment based on general rea-
sons of public utility, annihilates the traffic, destroys altogether 
the employment, and reduces to a nominal value the property on 
hand.”224 Thus, “the merchant of yesterday becomes the criminal 
of to-day,” and where he lives or works “becomes perhaps a nui-
sance.”225 Cooley then maintains the following: “A statute which 
can do this must be justified upon the highest reasons of public 
benefit; but, whether satisfactory or not, they rest exclusively in the 
legislative wisdom.”226 
Here is a clear statement of a court’s power when a state leg-
islative act does not interfere with interstate commerce and does 
not impair any contractual obligations. Cooley’s synthesis is  
directly opposed to the New York court’s conclusion in 
 
 220 Cooley, Treatise on Constitutional Limitations at 574 (cited in note 3). 
 221 Id at 576. 
 222 Id at 577. 
 223 Id (emphasis added). 
 224 Cooley, Treatise on Constitutional Limitations at 583–84 (cited in note 3). 
 225 Id at 584. 
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Wynehamer and contradicts the substantive due process thesis. 
Such matters are not for the courts to examine; they are matters 
of legislative wisdom. The legislature may even entirely eliminate 
traffic in and destroy the value of particular commodities. 
In the last few pages of Cooley’s chapter, he observes that “[i]t 
would be quite impossible to enumerate all the instances in which 
this [police] power is or may be exercised” because of the infinite 
number of ways an individual’s exercise of rights “may conflict 
with a similar exercise by others, or may be detrimental to the 
public order or safety.”227 Cooley then mentions the destruction of 
property for public purposes, the abatement of public nuisances, 
the “preservation of the public morals,” and the regulations of 
markets.228 What are the rules governing the exercise of this po-
lice power? “[W]e need not weary the reader with further enumer-
ation,” Cooley writes, because many of these regulations “have 
been previously referred to under the head of municipal  
by-laws.”229 
In sum, Cooley’s extended discussion of the police powers in 
his treatise is consistent with the three antebellum legal doc-
trines described in Part I. None appears to support the concept of 
substantive due process that has often been attributed to him. 
B. Due Process of Law and Arbitrary Power 
Elsewhere in his treatise, Cooley discusses the scope and na-
ture of legislative power, judicial power, and due process of law. 
These discussions are further evidence that Cooley did not ad-
vance a substantive due process concept. In particular, Cooley 
writes, consistently with Professors Chapman and McConnell, 
that legislatures violate due process when they “assume to dis-
pose of disputed rights,” in other words, when their acts are “in 
the nature of a judicial decree” or are “plainly an attempted adju-
dication upon the rights of the parties concerned” to a particular 
dispute.230 Legislative acts that “deprive parties of vested rights” 
are “obnoxious.”231 The “chief restriction” imposed by the due pro-
cess and law of the land clauses upon state governments is that 
“vested rights must not be disturbed.”232 
 
 227 Id at 594. 
 228 Cooley, Treatise on Constitutional Limitations at 594–96 (cited in note 3). 
 229 Id at 596. 
 230 Id at ix, 104, 105. 
 231 Id at 355. 
 232 Cooley, Treatise on Constitutional Limitations at 357–58 (cited in note 3). 
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Nor can legislatures abrogate a fundamental minimum of 
procedure: “[I]t would not be competent for the legislature to au-
thorize a court to proceed and adjudicate upon the rights of par-
ties, without giving them an opportunity to be heard before it,” 
writes Cooley, “and, for the same reason, it would be incompetent 
for it, by retrospective legislation, to make valid proceedings 
which had been had in the courts, but which were void for want 
of jurisdiction over the parties.”233 Judicial process may change 
from time to time, “but only with due regard to the old landmarks 
established for the protection of the citizen.”234 These prohibitions 
are only “substantive” in the rather uninteresting sense that they 
apply to the legislature, which of course they must if the particu-
lar process required by “due process of law” cannot be abridged by 
legislative enactments.235 
Cooley does have a tantalizing paragraph about arbitrary 
power. Cooley writes that “the whole community is also entitled 
at all times to demand the protection of the ancient principles 
which shield private rights against arbitrary interference, even 
though such interference may be under a rule impartial in its  
application.”236 Cooley relies on Bank of Columbia v Okely237 for 
this proposition—the same case on which Professors Barnett and 
 
 233 Id at 107. 
 234 Id at 356. 
 235 The passage quoted by Currie for the proposition that Cooley supported judicial 
review of the substantive reasonableness of legislation, Currie, The Constitution and the 
Supreme Court at 365 & n 11 (cited in note 99), also does not seem to substantiate that 
proposition. Cooley states: 
When the government, through its established agencies, interferes with the title 
to one’s property, or with his independent enjoyment of it, and its act is called in 
question as not in accordance with the law of the land, we are to test its validity 
by those principles of civil liberty and constitutional defence which have become 
established in our system of law, and not by any rules that pertain to forms of 
procedure merely. 
Cooley, Treatise on Constitutional Limitations at 356 (cited in note 3). This passage, stand-
ing alone, says nothing at all about judicial review of the substantive reasonableness of 
legislation. What principles of civil liberty and constitutional defense are established in 
our system of law is exactly the question Cooley was examining. At the end of that same 
paragraph, Cooley reiterates that due process of law “in each particular case means, such 
an exertion of the powers of government as the settled maxims of law sanction, and under 
such safeguards for the protection of individual rights as those maxims prescribe for the 
class of cases to which the one in question belongs”—without stating what those maxims 
or safeguards are. Id. 
 236 Cooley, Treatise on Constitutional Limitations at 355 (emphasis added) (cited in 
note 3). 
 237 17 US (4 Wheat) 235 (1819); Cooley, Treatise on Constitutional Limitations at 355 
n 3 (cited in note 3). 
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Bernick rely for the proposition that “in America the due process 
of law came to be understood as a guarantee against all arbitrary 
government action.”238 
Yet this case is consistent with a procedural understanding 
of due process. The reference to arbitrary power means only that 
the clause was “intended to secure the individual from the arbi-
trary exercise of the powers of government, unrestrained by the 
established principles of private rights and distributive justice.”239 
That is, rule by mere will, as opposed to rule by established laws, 
is arbitrary power. That was also John Locke’s definition of arbi-
trary power: “Absolute arbitrary Power” was “governing without 
settled standing laws.”240 Men enter society to “preserve their 
lives, liberties, and fortunes” and “to secure their peace and quiet” 
by “stated rules of right and Property.”241 Locke opposed “absolute 
arbitrary power over [men’s] persons and estates,” and thus “the 
ruling power ought to govern by declared and received laws, and 
not by extemporary dictates and undetermined resolutions.”242 
Government power “ought not to be arbitrary and at pleasure, 
[but rather] exercised by established and promulgated laws.”243 
Due process of law, simply put, prohibits arbitrary power—
arbitrary acts of the legislature that affect life, liberty, or property 
contrary to the existing standing laws. 
C. Substantive Due Process as a Rule of Statutory 
Construction 
Cooley’s separate discussion of unequal and partial legisla-
tion does suggest that what we understand by “substantive due 
process” may have played some kind of role in antebellum law: it 
may have been a kind of rule of statutory construction, by which 
courts presumed, when possible, that legislatures did not intend 
to infringe the fundamental principles of free government. Cooley 
 
 238 Barnett and Bernick, 60 Wm & Mary L Rev at 1643 & n 261 (cited in note 5). 
 239 Cooley, Treatise on Constitutional Limitations at 355 (emphasis added) (cited in 
note 3), quoting Okely, 17 US (4 Wheat) at 244. 
 240 John Locke, The Second Treatise of Government in John Locke, Two Treatises of 
Government and A Letter Concerning Toleration 160 (Yale 2003) (Ian Shapiro, ed) (origi-
nally published 1690) (emphasis added). 
 241 Id at 161. 
 242 Id. 
 243 Id. See also id at 160 (“The legislative, or supreme authority cannot assume to 
itself a power to rule by extemporary, arbitrary decrees; but is bound to dispense justice, 
and decide the rights of the subject, by promulgated, standing laws, and known authorized 
judges.”). 
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was particularly concerned with class legislation.244 In that con-
text, he used the term “arbitrary” more expansively: “The doubt 
might also arise whether a regulation made for any one class of 
citizens, entirely arbitrary in its character, and restricting their 
rights, privileges, or legal capacities in a manner before unknown 
to the law, could be sustained, notwithstanding its  
generality.”245 
Unreasonable distinctions, Justice Cooley says, would trans-
cend the proper exercise of legislative power even if there were no 
express constitutional prohibition: 
 
 244 Cooley, Treatise on Constitutional Limitations at 391–92 (cited in note 3):  
[E]very one has a right to demand that he be governed by general rules, and a 
special statute that singles his case out as one to be regulated by a different law 
from that which is applied in all similar cases would not be legitimate legisla-
tion, but an arbitrary mandate, unrecognized in free government. 
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he in fact immediately cites Locke for the proposition that legislators “are to govern by 
promulgated, established laws, not to be varied in particular cases.” Id at 392, quoting 
Locke, Second Treatise of Government at 163 (cited in note 240). The two principal cases 
that Cooley cites in support of these statements also stand for the proposition that courts 
cannot divest individuals of vested rights by special and partial legislation. Cooley quotes 
Wally’s Heirs v Kennedy, 10 Tenn (2 Yer) 554, 555 (1831): 
The rights of every individual must stand or fall by the same rule or law, that 
governs every other member of the body politic, or land, under similar circum-
stances; and every partial, or private law which directly proposes to destroy or 
affect individual rights, or does the same thing by affording remedies leading to 
similar consequences, is unconstitutional and void. 
Cooley, Treatise on Constitutional Limitations at 392 n 2 (cited in note 3). He also quotes 
Lewis v Webb, 3 Me 326, 336 (1825), for the proposition that 
it can never be within the bounds of legitimate legislation, to enact a special law, 
or pass a resolve dispensing with the general law, in a particular case, and grant-
ing a privilege and indulgence to one man, by way of exemption from the opera-
tion and effect of such general law, leaving all other persons under its operation.  
Cooley, Treatise on Constitutional Limitations at 392 n 2 (cited in note 3). But this case, 
too, involved a direct legislative interference with vested rights. An individual liable to 
another party by the decree of a probate court, from which appeal was only allowed within 
a short period of time, persuaded the state legislature to enact a special law permitting 
him to appeal the decree five years after it issued and the rights to the parties had vested. 
Lewis, 3 Me at 326–27. This was held to be a violation of the other parties’ right to have 
their interests adjudicated according to the “due course of law.” Id at 335. “If by such a 
legislative act as the resolve in question, an existing absolute decree or judgment could be 
vacated, and persons interested therein be deprived of their rights in this summary man-
ner,” the court asked, “what security does the citizen enjoy in virtue of the section of the 
declaration of rights before cited, viz.: ‘Every person for an injury done him in his person, 
reputation, property or immunities, shall have remedy by due course of law?’” Id, quoting 
Me Const Art I, § 19 (1819). 
 245 Cooley, Treatise on Constitutional Limitations at 393 (emphasis added) (cited in 
note 3). 
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[B]ut if the legislature should undertake to provide that per-
sons following some specified lawful trade or employment 
should not have capacity to make contracts, or to receive con-
veyances, or to build such houses as others were allowed to 
erect, or in any other way to make such use of their property 
as was permissible to others, it can scarcely be doubted that 
the act would transcend the due bounds of legislative power, 
even if it did not come in conflict with express constitutional 
provisions. The man or the class forbidden the acquisition or 
enjoyment of property in the manner permitted to the com-
munity at large would be deprived of liberty in particulars of 
primary importance to his or their “pursuit of happiness.”246 
This may come close to substantive due process, and this 
chapter has often been cited in support of it.247 But Cooley goes on 
to say that at most courts must charitably interpret such legisla-
tive acts. Because “[e]quality of rights, privileges, and capacities 
unquestionably should be the aim of the law,” when “special priv-
ileges are granted, or special burdens or restrictions imposed in 
any case,” it then 
must be presumed that the legislature designed to depart as 
little as possible from this fundamental maxim of govern-
ment. The State, it is to be presumed, has no favors to bestow, 
and designs to inflict no arbitrary deprivation of rights. Spe-
cial privileges are obnoxious, and discriminations against 
persons or classes are still more so, and as a rule of construc-
tion are always to be leaned against as probably not contem-
plated or designed.248 
There can be no question that Cooley believed that an arbi-
trary governmental restriction would be contrary to the “funda-
mental maxim” of free government, and “transcend the due 
bounds of legislative power.” But all courts could do in the face of 
such arbitrary and unreasonable legislation was to presume that 
the legislature intended minimal deviations from that maxim 
and, if possible, strictly construe the legislation.249 As explained 
 
 246 Id (first emphasis added). 
 247 See, for example, Gillman, The Constitution Besieged at 58 (cited in note 3) (quot-
ing from the passages described here). 
 248 Cooley, Treatise on Constitutional Limitations at 393 (emphases added) (cited in 
note 3). 
 249 In one case that Cooley cites in his text, the author of the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court’s opinion explicitly states, “If the legislature should pass a law in plain, unequivocal, 
and explicit terms, within the general scope of their constitutional power,” there is no 
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by one court Cooley cites: “All the Courts can do with odious stat-
utes which are constitutional, is, to chasten their harshness by 
construction.”250 Cooley’s comments on judicial review assert even 
more explicitly that it is not for courts to second-guess legislative 
judgments when such judgments are not in violation of any ex-
press constitutional provision.251 
 
governmental authority “to pronounce such an act void, merely because, in the opinion of 
the judicial tribunals, it was contrary to the principles of natural justice.” Id at 168 n 1, 
quoting Commonwealth v McCloskey, 2 Rawle 369, 373 (Pa 1830). 
 250 Cooley, Treatise on Constitutional Limitations at 168 n 1 (cited in note 3), quoting 
Beebe v State, 6 Ind 501, 528 (1855). 
 251 In passages rarely quoted in the relevant literature, Cooley expressly declares that 
a court cannot hold “a statute unconstitutional and void, solely on the ground of unjust 
and oppressive provisions, or because it is supposed to violate the natural, social, or polit-
ical rights of the citizen, unless it can be shown that such injustice is prohibited or such 
rights guaranteed or protected by the constitution.” Id at 164. It is true, he acknowledges, 
that some judges “have been understood to intimate a doctrine different from what is here 
asserted,” but Cooley asserts that their statements in such cases are made “rather by way 
of argument and illustration, . . . to induce a more cautious and patient examination of the 
statute, with a view to discover in it, if possible, some more just and reasonable legislative 
intent.” Id at 164–65. Such statements were not made for the purpose of “laying down a 
rule by which courts would be at liberty to limit, according to their own judgment and 
sense of justice and propriety, the extent of legislative power in directions in which the 
constitution had imposed no restraint.” Id at 165. 
 Cooley then summarizes: 
[T]here would, as it seems to us [Cooley], be very great probability of unpleasant 
and dangerous conflict of authority if the courts were to deny validity to legisla-
tive action on subjects within their control, on the assumption that the legisla-
ture had disregarded justice or sound policy. The moment a court ventures to 
substitute its own judgment for that of the legislature, in any case where the 
constitution has vested the legislature with power over the subject, that moment 
it enters upon a field where it is impossible to set limits to its authority. 
Id at 167–68. Cooley immediately supports this proposition with further discussion also 
worth quoting at length: 
The rule of law upon this subject appears to be, that, except where the constitu-
tion has imposed limits upon the legislative power, it must be considered as 
practically absolute, whether it operate according to natural justice or not in any 
particular case. The courts are not the guardians of the rights of the people of 
the State, unless those rights are secured by some constitutional provision which 
comes within the judicial cognizance. The remedy for unwise or oppressive leg-
islation, within constitutional bounds, is by an appeal to the justice and patriot-
ism of the representatives of the people. If this fail, the people in their sovereign 
capacity can correct the evil; but courts cannot assume their rights. The judiciary 
can only arrest the execution of a statute when it conflicts with the constitution. 
It cannot run a race of opinions upon points of right, reason, and expediency with 
the law-making power. Any legislative act which does not encroach upon the 
powers apportioned to the other departments of the government, being prima 
facie valid, must be enforced, unless restrictions upon the legislative power can 
be pointed out in the constitution, and the case shown to come within them. 
Id at 168 (citations omitted). 
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III.  SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS AND THE POLICE POWERS 
Soon after the Fourteenth Amendment’s adoption, the Su-
preme Court began to conflate the three antebellum doctrines. 
With citations to contracts, commerce, and municipal cases, all of 
the justices assumed that state legislatures were generally lim-
ited to legitimate exercises of their police powers. This conflation 
occurred in all of the opinions in the Slaughter-House Cases and 
also in Mugler v Kansas.252 By the time of Lochner, a general  
police-powers limitation on state legislatures had become firmly 
rooted in constitutional jurisprudence. 
This Part tables the Slaughter-House Cases because they 
were litigated largely under the Privileges or Immunities Clause. 
As I shall subsequently claim, a police-powers analysis may very 
well be relevant to this clause, and therefore the police powers 
may have been appropriately deployed in those cases. This Part 
thus begins with post–Slaughter-House cases under the Due  
Process Clause to show how the Supreme Court conflated the an-
tebellum doctrines under the guise of “due process of law.” It con-
cludes by returning to some modern scholars who may also be 
misinterpreting these antebellum cases. 
A. Barbier, Mugler, and Lochner 
Police powers featured in the due process context in Justice 
Stephen Field’s brief opinion in Barbier v Connolly.253 The Court 
held that the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses “un-
doubtedly intended . . . [to guarantee] that there should be no ar-
bitrary deprivation of life or liberty, or arbitrary spoliation of 
property,” and, among other guarantees, “that no impediment 
should be interposed to the pursuits of any one except as applied 
to the same pursuits by others under like circumstances.”254 But 
the Fourteenth Amendment was not “designed to interfere with 
the power of the State, sometimes termed its police power, to pre-
scribe regulations to promote the health, peace, morals, 
 
 252 123 US 623, 8 S Ct 273 (1887). 
 253 113 US 27 (1885). The case involved a municipal prohibition on “carry[ing] on the 
washing and ironing of clothes in public laundries and wash-houses, within certain pre-
scribed limits of the city and county, from ten o’clock at night until six o’clock on the morn-
ing of the following day.” Id at 30. The Court held that the “provision is purely a police 
regulation within the competency of any municipality possessed of the ordinary powers 
belonging to such bodies.” Id. 
 254 Id at 31. 
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education, and good order of the people.”255 Here we see the Court 
begin to deploy a concept of substantive due process—legislatures 
may only act consistently with the police powers. 
The Court’s next comprehensive examination of due process 
and the police powers did not occur until Mugler. In Mugler, a 
state constitutional provision prohibited the sale of all liquor in 
the state unless the seller was licensed and such sale was for sci-
entific or medical purposes.256 Mugler had built and owned a 
brewery before the state’s constitution was amended, and the 
question was whether such a prohibition on sale violated the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantees of due process and equal 
protection.257 Counsel for the state argued first. The right to use 
alcohol was specifically “limited by the police power of the 
state.”258 In support of that proposition, the attorney cited to Com-
merce Clause cases prior to the adoption of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.259 “All rights are held subject to the police power,” 
he went on to argue, which “extends to the right to regulate, pro-
hibit, and suppress the liquor traffic.”260 For this proposition coun-
sel cited the License Cases and Judge Dillon’s treatise, as well as 
cases involving contractual obligations.261 
Mugler’s counsel also responded in the language of police 
powers. He claimed that “[t]he right of the state to prohibit un-
wholesome trades, etc., is based on the general principle that 
every person ought to so use his own as not to injure his neigh-
bors,” and that this was “the police power.”262 He then cited to the 
License Cases, to Corfield v Coryell,263 and finally to Cooley’s pas-
sage that due process of law “means such an exertion of the power 
of government as the settled maxims of law permit and sanction, 
and under such safeguards for the protection of individual rights 
 
 255 Id. 
 256 Mugler, 123 US at 654–56.  
 257 Id at 625, 656–57.  
 258 Mugler, 8 S Ct at 285. 
 259 Id at 286, citing, for example, License Cases, 5 How at 631. 
 260 Mugler, 8 S Ct at 287. 
 261 Id, citing People v Hawley, 3 Mich 330 (1854), and Commonwealth v Tewksbury, 
52 Mass (11 Met) 55 (1846). 
 262 Mugler, 8 S Ct at 288. 
 263 6 F Cases 546, 551–52 (CC ED Pa 1825). Corfield was a widely cited case decided 
by Justice Bushrod Washington riding circuit that elaborated upon the meaning of the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV of the original US Constitution.  
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as those maxims prescribe.”264 He also cited to vested-rights due 
process cases.265 
Thus, Mugler’s counsel argued that the state cannot use its 
power to regulate to “deprive the citizen of the lawful use of his 
property, if it does not injuriously affect or endanger others. . . . 
Nor can it, in the exercise of the police power, enact laws that are 
unnecessary, and that will be oppressive to the citizen.”266 “The 
state could only restrain this right by virtue of the police power, 
which could only be exercised to the extent reasonable and neces-
sary for the preservation and promotion of the morals and health of 
the people of Kansas.”267 Counsel made several similar observa-
tions,268 for one of which he cited to Cooley’s treatise.269 
Justice John Marshall Harlan wrote for the Court. That the 
prohibition “does not necessarily infringe any right, privilege, or 
immunity secured by the Constitution of the United States, is 
made clear by the decisions of this court, rendered before and 
since the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment,” Harlan 
wrote.270 He then proceeded to discuss the scope of the police pow-
ers under the Commerce Clause cases.271 After citing to the earlier 
Fourteenth Amendment case of Munn v Illinois,272 Harlan asked: 
 
 264 Mugler, 8 S Ct at 288–89, citing License Cases, 5 How at 583, Corfield, 6 F Cases 
at 546, and Cooley, Treatise on Constitutional Limitations at 356 (cited in note 3). 
 265 Mugler, 8 S Ct at 289, citing Wynehamer, 13 NY at 432, and Hoke, 15 NC (4 Dev) 
at 15. 
 266 Mugler, 8 S Ct at 289. 
 267 Id at 291. 
 268 See id: 
The police power cannot go beyond the limit of what is necessary and reasonable 
for guarding against the evil which injures or threatens the public welfare in the 
given case, and the legislature, under the guise of that power, cannot strike down 
innocent occupations and destroy private property, the destruction of which is 
not reasonably necessary to accomplish the needed reform.  
Id at 292 (citations and emphasis omitted):  
The state cannot enact laws, not necessary to the preservation of the health and 
safety of the community, that will be oppressive and burdensome to the citizen. 
The constitutional guaranty of life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness is not lim-
ited by the temporary caprice of a present majority, and can be limited only by 
the absolute necessities of the public. No proposition is more firmly established 
than that the citizen has the right to adopt and follow such lawful and industrial 
pursuit, not injurious to the community, as he may see fit.  
 269 Id at 292, citing Thomas M. Cooley, A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations 
Which Rest upon the Legislative Power of the States of the American Union 110, 445, 446 
(Little, Brown 5th ed 1883). 
 270 Mugler, 123 US at 657. 
 271 Id at 657–59, discussing the License Cases, 46 US (5 How) at 504. 
 272 94 US (4 Otto) 113 (1876). 
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“But by whom, or by what authority, is it to be determined 
whether the manufacture of particular articles of drink, either for 
general use or for the personal use of the maker, will injuriously 
affect the public?”273 Harlan at first said this was a matter for the 
legislative branch.274 Yet, he added: 
It does not at all follow that every statute enacted ostensibly 
for the promotion of these ends, is to be accepted as a legiti-
mate exertion of the police powers of the State. There are, of 
necessity, limits beyond which legislation cannot rightfully 
go. . . . If, therefore, a statute purporting to have been en-
acted to protect the public health, the public morals, or the 
public safety, has no real or substantial relation to those ob-
jects, or is a palpable invasion of rights secured by the funda-
mental law, it is the duty of the courts to so adjudge, and 
thereby give effect to the Constitution.275 
Harlan relies on Barbier for support,276 discusses a series of 
obligations of contract cases,277 and then quotes Patterson v  
Kentucky278 for the proposition that state legislation “strictly and 
legitimately for police purposes, does not, in the sense of the Con-
stitution, necessarily intrench upon any authority which has been 
confided, expressly or by implication, to the national govern-
ment.”279 Patterson was a case about the Patent Clause, address-
ing the question reserved by the Court in Gibbons,280 and the 
Court relied on the Commerce Clause precedents.281 In Mugler, 
the Court ultimately held that no statute can “come within the 
Fourteenth Amendment, in any case, unless it is apparent that 
its real object is not to protect the community, or to promote the 
 
 273 Mugler, 123 US at 660. 
 274 Id at 661: 
Under our system that power is lodged with the legislative branch of the govern-
ment. It belongs to that department to exert what are known as the police pow-
ers of the State, and to determine, primarily, what measures are appropriate or 
needful for the protection of the public morals, the public health, or the public 
safety. 
 275 Id. 
 276 Id at 663, citing Barbier, 113 US at 31. 
 277 Mugler, 123 US at 664–65, discussing Butchers’ Union Slaughter-House and Live-
Stock Landing Co v Crescent City Live-Stock Landing and Slaughter-House Co, 111 US 
746, 751 (1884), Stone v Mississippi, 101 US 814, 816 (1879), and New Orleans Gas-Light 
Co v Louisiana Light & Heat Manufacturing Co, 115 US 650, 672 (1885). 
 278 97 US 501 (1878). 
 279 Mugler, 123 US at 665–66, quoting Patterson, 97 US at 504. 
 280 See notes 100–121 and accompanying text. 
 281 Patterson, 97 US at 501–04. 
2020] The Origins of Substantive Due Process 869 
 
general well-being, but, under the guise of police regulation, to 
deprive the owner of his liberty and property, without due process 
of law.”282 
By the time of Lochner, the police-powers doctrine was well 
entrenched. It was no surprise, then, that Justice Rufus Peckham 
observed that “there is a limit to the valid exercise of the police 
power by the State.”283 It was incumbent upon the Court to ascer-
tain whether a legislative act was “a fair, reasonable and appro-
priate exercise of the police power of the State,” or rather “an un-
reasonable, unnecessary and arbitrary interference with the right 
of the individual to his personal liberty or to enter into those con-
tracts in relation to labor which may seem to him appropriate or 
necessary for the support of himself and his family.”284 
In sum, after the Slaughter-House Cases, the Supreme Court, 
under the Due Process Clause, conflated the antebellum legal doc-
trines to conclude that the states themselves were limited to  
legitimate exercises of the police power. 
B. Modern Revisionists 
It now bears a brief mention that many of the substantive 
due process scholars with which this Article began285 may also be 
conflating these antebellum doctrines. Professor Howard Gillman 
maintains that antebellum state courts would “uphold legislation 
that (from their perspective) advanced the well-being of the com-
munity as a whole or promoted a true ‘public purpose,’” while they 
would “strike down legislation that (from their perspective) was 
designed to advance the special or partial interests of particular 
groups or classes.”286 For this proposition he cites a variety of con-
tracts cases, municipal cases, and vested rights cases, in addition 
to extensively citing Cooley.287 
Professor Mayer similarly cites a combination of these kinds 
of cases for the proposition that there was a “long history of sub-
stantive due process protections for liberty and property rights—
a body of law concerning constitutional limits on government 
 
 282 Mugler, 123 US at 669. 
 283 Lochner, 198 US at 56. 
 284 Id. 
 285 See note 3. 
 286 Gillman, The Constitution Besieged at 10 (cited in note 3). 
 287 See id at 45–60. Specifically, see id at 47–48, discussing Charles River Bridge (con-
tract case); id at 51–52, discussing Vadine’s Case, 23 Mass (6 Pick) 187 (1828) (municipal 
bylaw case); id at 53, discussing Wally’s Heirs v Kennedy, 10 Tenn 554 (1831) (vested rights 
case); id at 55–59, discussing Justice Cooley. 
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police powers that was well-established by the late nineteenth 
century.”288 According to Mayer, the Lochner-era Court “was 
merely enforcing these traditional constitutional limits on the 
scope of the police power.”289 For the more specific proposition that 
“[i]n a series of decisions from the 1790s to the 1850s, the highest 
courts of several states held that the law of the land clause in 
their state constitutions prohibited the legislature from passing 
laws that deprived citizens of their property,” Mayer cites to a 
municipal corporations case, a takings case, and two vested rights 
cases.290 
Most recently, Professors Barnett and Bernick also rely on 
these same kinds of cases, and particularly municipal corpora-
tions cases. In their paper, they argue that antebellum courts pro-
tected not only vested rights but also developed a kind of police-
powers version of due process. They write that “courts became 
more willing to look beyond the face of enactments to discern and 
evaluate the propriety of legislative ends” after the enactment of 
the Fourteenth Amendment, but that “there was continuity as 
well.”291 “Long before the Lochner era, antebellum courts repeat-
edly affirmed that legislative power was inherently limited by the 
ends for which legitimate governments are established” and that 
legislatures could only put constraints on life, liberty, or property 
to “protect the community, or to promote the general well- 
being.”292 The police power, in other words, “was understood to be 
limited by its functions—the protection of health, safety, and mor-
als of the public.”293 For this proposition they cite to Austin v  
Murray,294 which we encountered above and which involved the 
invalidation of Charlestown’s bylaw prohibiting the bringing of 
the dead into the town.295 And for the proposition that class dis-
tinctions or deprivations needed to be “reasonably calculated to 
 
 288 Mayer, 60 Mercer L Rev at 571, 586–89, 594, 603 (cited in note 3). 
 289 Id at 571. 
 290 Id at 587 & n 104, citing Zylstra v Corporation of Charleston, 1 SCL (1 Bay) 382 
(SC Com Pl 1794) (municipal corporations case); Lindsay v Commissioners, 2 SCL (2 Bay) 
38 (SC Const App 1796) (takings case), Trustees of the University of North Carolina v Foy, 
5 NC (1 Mur) 58 (1805) (vested rights case), and Bowman v Middleton, 1 SCL (1 Bay) 252 
(SC Com Pl 1792) (vested rights case). 
 291 Barnett and Bernick, 60 Wm & Mary L Rev at 1636 (cited in note 5). 
 292 Id, quoting Mugler, 123 US at 669. 
 293 Barnett and Bernick, 60 Wm & Mary L Rev at 1637 (cited in note 5). 
 294 33 Mass (16 Pick) 121 (1834).  
 295 See notes 63–71 and accompanying text. 
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serve proper ends,”296 they cite what appears to be a Commerce 
Clause case and a vested rights case.297 
In short, many modern scholars appear to make the same 
move the Court made in the 1870s and after. Citing a host of  
municipal corporations, negative commerce, and contracts 
cases—as well as Cooley’s treatise—they conclude that states 
were generally limited to reasonable exercises of the police power. 
IV.  PRIVILEGES OR IMMUNITIES AND INCORPORATED RIGHTS 
The antebellum doctrines call into question claims of sub-
stantive due process scholars who contend that the seeds of a  
police-power version of substantive due process were sown by the 
time of, and aided by, Justice Cooley’s well-known treatise. The 
doctrines demonstrate that, quite instead of being rooted in ante-
bellum cases or Cooley’s treatise, the concept arose as the Su-
preme Court conflated the three antebellum doctrines after the 
adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
There may, of course, be other reasons to adopt substantive 
due process today of the kind that limits the acts of state govern-
ments. For example, state legislatures today engage in much the 
same kinds of activities in which local governments used to en-
gage. Much economic legislation now originates at the state level. 
Because of the implications for liberty and property, this trans-
ference of activity from the local to the state level may supply a 
normative reason for why courts ought to police this kind of leg-
islation for substantive unreasonableness. However, this ra-
tionale would not have jurisprudential support in the history. 
What mattered to the early courts was the unit of government 
doing the legislating, not the nature of the legislation; hence a 
state legislature could ratify the unreasonable act of a municipal 
corporation.298 
 
 296 Barnett and Bernick, 60 Wm & Mary L Rev at 1637 & n 227 (cited in note 5). 
 297 Vanderbilt v Adams, 7 Cow 349, 351 (NY 1827) (upholding a statute allowing mu-
nicipal authorities to regulate river traffic only because it was an exercise of police power 
“calculated for the benefit of all”); Baggs’s Appeal, 43 Pa 512, 515 (1862):  
Any form of direct governmental action on private rights, which, if unusual, is 
dictated by no imperious public necessity, or which makes a special law for a 
particular person, or gives directions for the regulation and control of a particu-
lar case after it has arisen, is always arbitrary and dangerous in principle, and 
almost always unconstitutional. 
 298 See notes 82–85 and accompanying text. 
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Although the antebellum cases probably do not support sub-
stantive due process, the police powers could play a new and im-
portant role as a result of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. Prior to that amendment, the only two regularly litigated 
federal constitutional prohibitions on the states were the Com-
merce and Contracts Clauses. After the amendment, the federal 
Constitution imposed new prohibitions on the states, most perti-
nently the Privileges or Immunities Clause and incorporated 
rights. This Part considers how a police-powers analysis might 
function in cases involving these new federal constitutional pro-
hibitions, by analogy to the Commerce and Contracts Clause ju-
risprudence. Part IV.A examines how the police powers could af-
fect a Privileges or Immunities Clause analysis, whether under a 
fundamental-rights reading or an antidiscrimination reading of 
the clause. It suggests that, on either reading, a genuine and rea-
sonable exercise of the police power might serve as a defense to a 
claim of abridgement, as it served as a defense to a claim that the 
state had improperly regulated interstate commerce or impaired 
existing contractual obligations. Part IV.B then shows how the 
Slaughter-House Cases can be—and ought to be—reimagined 
along these lines. Part IV.C then aims to show how the police 
powers could also be used as a defense against claims of abridging 
or infringing incorporated rights; indeed, the Supreme Court 
adopted just this kind of an analysis in First Amendment cases 
in the first few decades after that right was incorporated. 
A. Two Views of Privileges or Immunities 
The Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment declares: “No State shall make or enforce any law 
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the 
United States.”299 There is a debate in the literature about 
whether the privileges and immunities of citizens protected by 
this clause include only federal rights, or also state-defined civil 
rights like contract and property rights. Most scholars agree that 
the clause referred at a minimum to state-defined rights and that 
Justice Samuel Miller was incorrect in the Slaughter-House Cases 
to limit the clause only to the privileges of national citizenship.300 
 
 299 US Const Amend XIV, § 1, cl 2. 
 300 See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 US (16 Wall) at 74. For scholarship criticizing Jus-
tice Miller’s approach, consider Randy E. Barnett, Restoring the Lost Constitution: The 
Presumption of Liberty 199 (Princeton 2004); Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme 
Court at 344–51 (cited in note 99); John Harrison, Reconstructing the Privileges or 
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Assuming that the clause includes state-defined privileges 
like the right to contract and acquire property, there are then at 
least two possible readings of the clause. Professors David  
Currie,301 John Harrison,302 and Christopher Green303 have ad-
vanced the view that the Privileges or Immunities Clause princi-
pally required nondiscrimination in the provision of privileges or 
immunities defined by state law. According to this view, it is en-
tirely up to the states to define what privileges or immunities they 
wish to give their citizens. But whatever such privileges they do 
give, they must do so equally to all citizens.304 In contrast, the fun-
damental rights view of the clause maintains that the privileges 
or immunities of state citizenship are fundamental and cannot be 
defined by the state at all in any way that diminishes them.305 
Under either reading of the clause, the police-powers analysis 
could be relevant. This clause was now a limitation on the states 
just as were the Contracts and Commerce Clauses. Therefore, if 
the clause prohibits the states from acting in a certain manner, 
the states might, by analogy, defend their actions on the grounds 
that they are not abridging privileges or immunities but rather 
acting in legitimate pursuit of their police powers. Thus, under 
the fundamental rights reading, just as states cannot regulate 
commerce or impair contractual obligations, they cannot abridge 
fundamental rights; but, as in the other two contexts, the states 
can make legitimate police regulations. With the addition of the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause to the Constitution, courts easily 
could have said that states could not abridge the privileges or im-
munities of citizens, but that legitimate police regulations are not 
abridgements. 
 
Immunities Clause, 101 Yale L J 1385, 1414–16 (1992). For scholarship defending Miller’s 
approach, see Kurt T. Lash, The Fourteenth Amendment and the Privileges and Immuni-
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The police powers could work similarly under the antidis-
crimination reading. An antidiscrimination reading would pro-
hibit arbitrary, but not all, discriminations. That is why a child 
may not be permitted to drink alcohol or drive a car: such discrim-
inations are genuinely connected to a legitimate police-power pur-
pose. A legitimate police regulation would militate against a find-
ing of discrimination, and vice versa. In this context, the police 
powers would play a more restrained role than they would under 
the fundamental rights reading because there would have to be 
inequality for the clause to be triggered at all. 
Importantly, under either reading the police-powers frame-
work would be significantly narrower than under a general rule 
limiting states to proper exercises of the police power. By analogy 
to the commerce or contracts cases, the state would only be lim-
ited if the privileges or immunities of citizenship were involved, 
and only if there was a potential for an abridgement of them. 
Thus, the analysis would be limited to situations involving fun-
damental rights or discrimination. If neither condition obtained, 
the states would likely not be limited to proper exercises of the 
police power. 
B. The Slaughter-House Cases 
The Slaughter-House Cases may now be seen in a new light. 
In those cases, all the litigants and justices relied on commerce, 
contract, and municipal corporations cases for the proposition that 
the states themselves were generally limited to genuine exercises 
of the police power. Although the justices appear to have simply 
conflated the various doctrines, their reasoning could be supported 
by analogy to Contracts and Commerce Clause jurisprudence. 
In the Slaughter-House Cases, the state legislature of Louisiana 
granted a monopoly to one particular company for a period of 
twenty-five years for both the landing of all animals in the city 
and areas surrounding New Orleans, and also for the slaughter-
ing of animals.306 This law effectively required one hundred butch-
ers who had previously pursued slaughtering as their occupation 
to close their businesses and slaughter only on the premises of the 
favored company, to which they had to pay some amount of rent 
and tribute.307 These provisions were challenged by counsel as 
 
 306 Slaughter-House Cases, 83 US (16 Wall) at 36. 
 307 Id at 42, 48. See also id at 86 (Field dissenting) (suggesting as many as four hun-
dred butchers may have been affected). 
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creating a monopoly in violation of common law; as violating the 
Thirteenth Amendment’s prohibition on involuntary servitude; 
and as violating the Privileges or Immunities Clause, the Due 
Process Clause, and the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment.308 
Although the majority of the Court upheld that statute, both 
the majority opinion and each of the dissenting opinions relied on 
the police powers. 
1. The majority opinion. 
The attorney for the butchers of New Orleans asked: “[W]hat 
are ‘privileges and immunities’ in the sense of the Constitution? 
They are undoubtedly the personal and civil rights which usage, 
tradition, the habits of society, written law, and the common sen-
timents of people have recognized as forming the basis of the in-
stitutions of the country.”309 But it will surely be objected, he went 
on to say, that such a law could be justified “as an exercise of the 
police power; a matter confessedly, in its general scope, within the 
jurisdiction of the States.”310 There was no doubt that “the subject 
of sanitary laws belong to the exercise of the power set up; but it 
does not follow there is no restraint on State power of legislation 
in police matters.”311 In support of the limitation of police powers 
on the states, counsel cited to Gibbons and the  
Passenger Cases.312 
In response to these arguments, Justice Miller for the Court 
argued that “[t]he wisdom of the monopoly granted by the legis-
lature may be open to question,” but “[t]he power here exercised 
by the legislature of Louisiana is, in its essential nature, one 
which has been, up to the present period in the constitutional his-
tory of this country, always conceded to belong to the States, how-
ever it may now be questioned in some of its details.”313 He then 
discussed the general nature of the police powers of the states, 
observing that they extend “to the protection of the lives, limbs, 
 
 308 Id at 43–44, 48–49 (majority). 
 309 Id at 55. 
 310 Slaughter-House Cases, 83 US (16 Wall) at 56. 
 311 Id. 
 312 Id at 56–57. 
 313 Id at 61–62 (emphasis in original).  
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health, comfort, and quiet of all persons”—a quotation from 
Thorpe, the contracts case out of Vermont.314 
Miller stated that because regulations of slaughterhouses 
were “among the most necessary and frequent exercises of this 
power,” it was not necessary to seek “a comprehensive definition” 
of the police power, “but rather look for the proper source of its 
exercise.”315 He then launched into an extended discussion of  
Gibbons, Miln, and other commerce cases.316 He concluded that 
“the statute under consideration is aptly framed to remove from 
the more densely populated part of the city, the noxious slaugh-
ter-houses, . . . and to locate them where the convenience, health, 
and comfort of the people require they shall be located.”317 In lan-
guage reminiscent of Miln, he wrote that “the means adopted 
by the act for this purpose are appropriate, are stringent, and 
effectual.”318 
It is hardly clear that any of this analysis was necessary for 
the disposition of the case. After all, Miller went on to state that 
there was no violation of the Thirteenth Amendment,319 no viola-
tion of due process of law or equal protection,320 and that the Priv-
ileges or Immunities Clause only guarantees the privileges of na-
tional as opposed to state citizenship (and no one could claim that 
the privilege of pursuing a particular occupation derived from the 
federal government).321 Nevertheless, the police-powers analogy 
seems sound. If the Privileges or Immunities Clause does require 
equality in the provision of privileges and immunities defined by 
state law, then surely a legitimate exercise of the police power 
militates against a finding of impermissible discrimination. 
2. Justice Field’s dissent. 
Justice Field’s dissent also relied on a police-powers analysis 
and the antebellum doctrines. “It is contended in justification for 
the act in question,” Field wrote, 
 
 314 Slaughter-House Cases, 83 US (16 Wall) at 62, quoting Thorpe, 27 Vt at 149. See 
also Part I.C. 
 315 Slaughter-House Cases, 83 US (16 Wall) at 63. 
 316 Id at 63–64. 
 317 Id at 64. 
 318 Compare id, with Miln, 36 US at 137 (“[W]hilst a state is acting within the legiti-
mate scope of its power as to the end to be attained, it may use whatsoever means, being 
appropriate to that end, it may think fit.”). 
 319 Slaughter-House Cases, 83 US (16 Wall) at 69. 
 320 Id at 80–81. 
 321 Id at 77–79. 
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that it was adopted in the interest of the city, to promote its 
cleanliness and protect its health, and was the legitimate ex-
ercise of what is termed the police power of the State. That 
power undoubtedly extends to all regulations affecting the 
health, good order, morals, peace, and safety of society, and 
is exercised on a great variety of subjects, and in almost num-
berless ways. . . . But under the pretence of prescribing a po-
lice regulation the State cannot be permitted to encroach 
upon any of the just rights of the citizen, which the Constitu-
tion intended to secure against abridgment.322 
Field agreed that the provisions requiring the landing and 
slaughtering of animals below the city of New Orleans, and the 
inspection of animals, were legitimate police regulations, but “it 
would not endanger the public health if other persons were also 
permitted to carry on the same business within the same district 
under similar conditions as to the inspection of the animals.”323 
Such a deprivation, Field wrote, was a violation of the Privi-
leges or Immunities Clause. That clause “assumes that there are 
such privileges and immunities which belong of right to citizens 
as such, and ordains that they shall not be abridged by State leg-
islation.”324 It “refers to the natural and inalienable rights which 
belong to all citizens.”325 Field then proceeded to enumerate some 
of these rights, first with a reference to the Civil Rights Act of 
1866326 and then to Justice Bushrod Washington’s circuit opinion 
in Corfield.327 “Clearly among these” privileges and immunities, 
Field wrote, “must be placed the right to pursue a lawful employ-
ment in a lawful manner, without other restraint than such as 
equally affects all persons.”328 
Field contended that in so few instances had such fundamen-
tal privileges been so flagrantly violated, but whenever this had 
 
 322 Id at 87 (Field dissenting). 
 323 Slaughter-House Cases, 83 US (16 Wall) at 87 (Field dissenting). 
 324 Id at 96. 
 325 Id. 
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occurred, “the enactment interfering with the privilege of the cit-
izen has been pronounced illegal and void.”329 For this proposition, 
Field cited Rumpff—which we encountered previously330—and 
two other municipal corporations cases,331 and he quoted one of 
them for the proposition that bylaws must be reasonable.332 “In all 
these cases there is a recognition of the equality of right among 
citizens in the pursuit of the ordinary avocations of life, and a 
declaration that all grants of exclusive privileges, in contraven-
tion of this equality, are against common right, and void.”333 Thus, 
the states may only “prescribe such regulations for every pursuit 
and calling of life as will promote the public health, secure the 
good order and advance the general prosperity of society.”334 
After raising Rumpff, Justice Field made the following  
remark: “It is true that the court in this opinion was speaking of 
a municipal ordinance and not of an act of the legislature of a 
State.”335 Field observed, however, that “a legislative body is no 
more entitled to destroy the equality of rights of citizens, nor to 
fetter the industry of a city, than a municipal government. These 
rights are protected from invasion by the fundamental law.”336 
Field does not analogize to the Contracts and Commerce 
Clauses explicitly and, indeed, his reliance on the municipal cases 
appears to be misplaced. But his reasoning may nevertheless be 
valid. Now that the states themselves are prohibited from abridg-
ing the privileges of citizens, perhaps the police-power limitation 
now applies to the states as well. A legitimate exercise of the po-
lice power may now be a defense to a claim of abridgement.337 
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C. Incorporated Rights 
The Fourteenth Amendment has also been interpreted as in-
corporating most of the Bill of Rights against the states. Whether 
or not incorporation is correct as a matter of the amendment’s 
original meaning is beyond the scope of this Article. But, taking 
incorporation as given, the federal Bill of Rights now serves as a 
source of new federal constitutional prohibitions against the 
states. By analogy to the antebellum cases, the states ought to be 
able to defend against claims of abridgement or infringement by 
invoking their police powers. 
Indeed, this framework for analyzing incorporated rights ap-
pears to have been the Court’s preferred approach in First 
Amendment cases in the first few decades after that amendment 
was incorporated. In Gitlow v New York,338 the 1925 case incorpo-
rating the First Amendment against the states, the Supreme 
Court explicitly held that a proper exercise of the police powers 
would insulate a state from challenge, and upheld the state stat-
ute precisely on that ground: 
 That a State in the exercise of its police power may punish 
those who abuse this freedom by utterances inimical to the 
public welfare, tending to corrupt public morals, incite to 
crime, or disturb the public peace, is not open to question. . . . 
 By enacting the present statute the State has determined, 
through its legislative body, that utterances advocating the 
overthrow of organized government by force, violence and un-
lawful means, are so inimical to the general welfare and in-
volve such danger of substantive evil that they may be penal-
ized in the exercise of its police power. That determination 
must be given great weight. . . . And the case is to be consid-
ered “in the light of the principle that the State is primarily 
the judge of regulations required in the interest of public 
safety and welfare;” and that its police “statutes may only be 
declared unconstitutional where they are arbitrary or 
 
regulation cannot infringe.” Id at 114. The test to determine validity was whether the act 
was a legitimate exercise of the police power. If “[i]t is onerous, unreasonable, arbitrary, 
and unjust,” then “[i]t has none of the qualities of a police regulation,” but “[i]f it were 
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(emphasis added). 
 338 268 US 652 (1925). 
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unreasonable attempts to exercise authority vested in the 
State in the public interest.” 
 We cannot hold that the present statute is an arbitrary or 
unreasonable exercise of the police power of the State unwar-
rantably infringing the freedom of speech or press; and we 
must and do sustain its constitutionality.339 
This police-powers framework, which the Court deployed in 
subsequent cases,340 is quite different from modern First Amend-
ment doctrine, which limits state regulations to certain “categor-
ical” exceptions from the First Amendment orbit.341 At least his-
torically, states would be able to attempt to justify any regulation 
of speech or press on the grounds of the police power; the courts 
would then ensure that their exercise of this power was genuine 
and reasonable. On this reading, for example, prohibitions on 
viewing animal crush videos or the sale of violent video games to 
minors seem easy to sustain.342 And now that the Second Amend-
ment has been incorporated against the states, this framework 
could apply to such cases, too. 
CONCLUSION 
In recent years, scholars have debated the meaning of the 
term “due process of law,” and whether it included a substantive 
as well as procedural component. This Article has contributed to 
this debate by approaching it from the other direction: Whence 
did the postbellum concept of substantive due process derive? 
This Article has shown that this concept does not appear to have 
much direct support in the antebellum legal cases. Rather, sub-
stantive due process arose as the Court combined distinct doc-
trines—the common law of corporations as applied to municipal 
governments and the Contracts and negative Commerce Clause 
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doctrines—under the general guise of due process of law after the 
adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
For legal support, the proponents of substantive due process 
must turn away from the Due Process Clause and toward the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause. Depending on one’s reading of 
that clause, limiting state power to legitimate exercises of police 
powers may be enforceable as a matter of federal constitutional 
law; at least, an improper exercise of the police powers would be 
some evidence of an abridgement of the privileges or immunities 
of citizenship, whatever those may be. But any such limitation on 
state power would not derive from due process of law. 
